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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation consists of three studies on world culture and the individual life course. The 
first study (Chapter 2) accesses the grassroots-level prevalence of world culture’s schema of 
national development.  Using survey data from the Developmental Idealism project, I find 
substantial similarities among the national developmental hierarchies constructed by respondents 
in eight culturally diverse countries, which strongly conform to the versions based on the United 
Nations’ Human Development Index.  Furthermore, such conformity is positively associated 
with one’s educational attainment and the number of international organizations in one’s country.     
The second study (Chapter 3) continues to examine the role of developmental thinking in 
the making of family values.  Using data collected in Gansu Province in China, I show that 
individuals’ endorsement of neolocal residence, self-choice marriage, gender egalitarianism, late 
marriage for women, and low fertility depends on the conjunction of preference for development 
and beliefs in its association with those family attributes.  In addition, the impact of 
developmental thinking on family values holds robust in the presence of local Islamic religion 
and does not differ significantly between Muslims and non-Muslims.       
The third study (Chapter 4) examines the opportunity structure of adult higher education 
which accounts for at least 40% of China’s college credentials production.  Using retrospective 
life histories from the 2003 Chinese General Social Survey, I find that while family obligations 
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(i.e., marriage, parenthood) prevent people from attending colleges at ages 18-45, having a job 
increases the hazard of going back to college.  The positive effect of work, however, is entirely 
attributable to institutional sponsorship based on affiliations with Party/government agencies and 
state-owned professional services, cadre leadership, and Party membership.  I also find that the 
state sponsorship became even stronger in the post-1978 Reform era.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
My dissertation research is driven by an interest in understanding the worldwide convergence 
toward the Western life course model, such as prolonged education, late marriage, neolocal 
residence, and low fertility.  I am particularly interested in the role of the idea of societal 
development in facilitating such behavioral changes.  The three studies of my dissertation 
examine, respectively, the international prevalence and diffusion of developmental thinking, its 
influences on attitudes toward family matters, and higher education in the presence of alternative 
adulthood engagements.  
Chapter 2 of my dissertation assesses the degree of consensus on national developmental 
hierarchies perceived by individuals in eight culturally diverse countries.  Using data from the 
Developmental Idealism project, I find substantial similarities among respondents’ evaluations of 
different countries’ levels of development.  In general, respondents’ evaluations strongly 
conform to the United Nations’ Human Development Index (HDI), and such conformity is 
positively associated with one’s educational attainment and the number of international 
organizations in one’s country.  I draw on the world society theory and argue that, through 
formal education and international association, the world culture script of national development 
(as represented by HDI) gives rise to a standardized worldview at the individual level.  While 
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developmental thinking has been well documented at the nation-state and organizational level, 
this paper is the first study of its prevalence and diffusion at the individual level.  The 
implication is that, as common people around the world agree on which countries are more 
developed, social attributes of those countries are likely to be endorsed and adopted.  
In Chapter 3 I investigate the influence of developmental thinking on family matters in 
the context of contemporary China.  Specifically, I ask if the endorsement of development leads 
to the endorsement of certain family attributes that are believed to be common in more 
developed countries.  Using data from a DI survey in Gansu Province, China, I ascertain that 
positive views of development increase the likelihood of endorsing neolocal residence, self-
choice marriage, gender equality, and fewer children.  Furthermore, these positive effects are 
robust in the presence of local Islamic beliefs, which operate in the opposite directions.  In this 
study, I apply a version of the expectancy-value model in psychology to articulate how the 
formation of various family values hinges on the unifying idea of development.   
Chapter 4 is a historical analysis of Chinese adulthood higher education (AHE). While 
direct progression from secondary to tertiary education was never universally successful, many 
who missed their first opportunities managed to resume higher education at older ages. This 
chapter, for the first time, examines Chinese people’s life course dynamics in AHE enrollment. 
Using life history data from Chinese General Social Survey 2003, I found that while marriage 
and parenthood reduced the likelihood of AHE enrollment, employment had a positive effect, 
which went beyond simple life course logics and found an institutional explanation in work-
based state sponsorship (i.e., affiliations with Party/government agencies and state-owned 
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professional services, cadre leadership, and Party membership). Furthermore, certain institutional 
effects became stronger in the context of educational expansion during the post-1978 reform 
period—a finding consistent with previous research on China’s institutional changes as well as 
the “maximally maintained inequality” proposition in the literature on educational stratification.
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CHAPTER 2 
World Culture at Individual Level:  
Individual Conformity to the Schema of National Development
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
A theory of world society has been articulated (Krücken and Drori 2009; Meyer et al. 
1997a) and used to account for many global-scale phenomena in contemporary times, 
such as state organizational isomorphism (Meyer et al. 1997a), rise of international non-
governmental organizations (Boli and Thomas 1997), mass schooling (Meyer et al. 1992), 
expansion of higher education (Schofer and Meyer 2005; Frank and Meyer 2007), 
dissemination of environmentalism (Longhofer and Schofer 2010; Meyer et al. 1997b), 
diffusion of human rights (Koo and Ramirez 2009), and spread of family and individual 
attributes defined as modern (Meyer 1986, 1988; Thornton et al. 2012c).  Under the 
world society framework, these processes of globalization are conceptualized as enacting 
various cultural models of a world society (Boli and Lechner 2001, 2008; Lechner 2009).   
While most empirical research in the world society literature was conducted at 
nation-state or organizational levels, it has been theorized that world cultural models have 
been disseminated and enacted globally at both macro and micro levels (Meyer et al. 
1997a).  Proponents of world society theory have maintained a clear emphasis on the 
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importance of individual actorhood (Frank and Meyer 2002; Frank et al. 1995; Meyer 
2010; Meyer and Jepperson 2000; Thomas et al. 1987)—it has been theorized that in the 
post-war period, individuals were empowered by the idea of the “legitimated self” and 
have replaced states, corporations, and other elite organizations to be the ontological 
foundation of the new world society (Meyer 2010).  This paper seeks to expand world 
society scholarship by assessing and understanding the impact of world culture at the 
individual level.  Specifically, we investigate lay people’s conformity to world culture’s 
schema of national development.   
Development has a central place in world culture’s scripts for nation-states 
(Meyer et al. 1997a).  To illustrate how world culture gives rise to similar national orders 
and isomorphic changes in different countries, Meyer et al. (1997a: 145-146) 
hypothesized a newly discovered island society and predicted that “…without knowing 
anything about the history, culture, practices, or traditions that obtained in this 
previously unknown society, we could forecast many changes that, upon ‘discovery,’ 
would descend on the island under the general rubric of ‘development’.”  In other words, 
the notion of development yields a highly rationalized and teleological worldview which 
prescribes the trajectory of societal change.  As states, organizations, and individuals are 
constructed to accept that all countries should and would progress from “undeveloped” 
origins to “developed” status, which has clearly defined societal characteristics, this idea 
unleashes powerful agency that leads—at least partially—to global convergences toward 
various developmental goals of modern nation-states, including bureaucratic governance, 
connections to world society, scientific research, mass education, human rights, and so on.  
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The global diffusion of and consensus on national developmental ideals since WWII have 
been documented at nation-state and organizational levels (e.g., Chabbott 1999).  
However, institutional authority is not equal to individual prevalence.  It is therefore 
important to empirically assess to what extent the ideas of lay people in different parts of 
the world are constructed by world culture’s schema of national development—after all, 
it is individuals, more so than elite organizations, that constitute the ontological basis of 
the increasingly stateless world society (Meyer 2010; Meyer et al. 1987).     
In this sense, this paper makes distinct contributions to world society scholarship 
by examining whether and how individual actors are influenced by the world culture.  We 
do so by comparing lay respondents’ evaluations of national development of certain 
countries to those offered by the world culture.  We also investigate how the outcome 
depends on major diffusion mechanisms of the world culture.   
 
2.2 Conceptual Framework 
2.2.1 Historical Versions of Societal Development  
World culture is not the only or the first script that defines societal development.  The 
conceptualization of development, or progress, has existed across people, space, and time 
(e.g., Nisbet 1980; Sanderson 1990; Sztompka 1993; Thornton 2005: 13-44).  Explicit 
ideas of societal development can be traced back to Western classical thoughts.  The 
ancient Greeks typically imagined a model of cyclic history where individual societies 
went through birth, maturation, decline, and death—a simple metaphorical inference 
   
7 
 
from the individual life-cycle (Thornton 2005: 16).  However, the notion of linear 
progress was already seen in the work of such major thinkers as Plato (c. 428-427 BC), 
Aristotle (384-322 BC), Lucretius (c. 99-55 BC), and Seneca (c. 4 BC-65 AD) (Nisbet 
1980: 10-46).  A key assumption that was articulated by Greco-Roman thinkers was the 
perfectibility of human conditions (i.e., politics, economy, culture, and social 
organization) through human efforts (Sztompka 1993).   
In the Judeo-Christian tradition, which was heavily influenced and best 
represented by the work of St. Augustine (354-430 AD), the earthly history (i.e., before 
the Judgment Day) is destined to be a non-repeated progressive journey of all humanity 
through distinct stages toward an earthly paradise in the future.  In this and various 
versions of millennialism in many centuries to come, human development has become an 
inevitable course of history determined by the universal power of God.   
The Greek human-based historical models were typically subject to degeneration 
as in individual life-cycle, while the optimism of linear progress was mainly a product of 
Christian faith.  However, since medieval times a reasoning of linear societal 
development had been championed on the basis of continuous accumulation of human 
knowledge (e.g., Roger Bacon in the 13
th
 century), which was believed to transcend 
individual life and is not bound to the fate of human demise.  Though individuals die, 
mankind, declared many Enlightenment thinkers, would never degenerate.  In other 
words, the basis of societal development was now shifting from divine providence to 
human genius.  Although many developmental models conceived during this period 
remained part of the Divine Plan, relatively secular utopian ideals began to gain 
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increasing attention, famous examples including The City of the Sun by Tommaso 
Campanella (1568-1639) and the “universal history” by Turgot (1727-81).  This trend of 
secularization culminated in Condorcet’s (1743-94) Sketch for a Historical Picture of the 
Progress of the Human Spirit. The book formulated a nine-stage schema of historical 
development leading to an auspicious future of freedom, equality, and justice, which, 
importantly, was determined by knowledge and human nature rather than any godly 
forces (Baker 2004).  
The 19
th
 century is regarded as an era of triumph of the idea of development—at 
least among elite intellectuals in Western Europe.  Its central story—advancement in 
human conditions—was being convincingly proven by everyday experience during the 
political and industrial revolutions in the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries.  Such credibility greatly 
enhanced the teleological power in the idea of development and made it a popular tool of 
argument or advocacy.  For example, Auguste Comte (1798-1857) promoted a positive 
science by associating it with human development; Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) used it 
to exemplify an “evolutionary” view of society whose essence was structural and 
functional differentiation, a view to which Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) also adhered; 
Karl Marx (1818-83) also built teleological development into his historical materialism 
and called for communist society.   
Clearly, teleology so far had been a persistent trait of developmental stories—
religious or secular.  Another feature, which became increasingly salient since 
geographical discoveries, has been the ethnocentric assumption that all human societies 
would pass through the same developmental trajectory as had the “developed” Western 
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countries, albeit at different rates (Thornton 2005).  This seemingly parsimonious 
developmental paradigm offered a convenient explanation for the observed heterogeneity 
between societies (or nation-states as they later “developed” into)—that they were simply 
at different stages of development.  By thinking so, the qualitative differences among 
societies were all boiled down to a single (though composite) scale of development.  
Developmental thinking had thereafter become, at least partially, a hegemonic discourse 
and been used to deprive non-Western societies of their cultural identities and to force 
global convergence toward the Western model.   
 
2.2.2 World Culture’s Rationalization of National Development  
Contemporary scholarship has critically reflected on the historical influences of the idea 
of development or modernization in recent centuries (Amin 1989; Baker 1998; Bock 
1956; Böröcz 2000; Böröcz and Sarkar 2005; Chakrabarty 2000; Comaroff and Comaroff 
1992; Hodgen 1964; Jennings 1975; Mandelbaum 1971; Nisbet 1969; Szreter 1993; Tilly 
1984; Wallerstein 1991).  Along with its teleology and uniformity assumptions, the 
developmental model has been a popular tool of persuasion.  It has been manipulated by 
proponents of racism, radical nationalism, and totalitarianism, to have resulted in, at least 
in part, colonial and racial injustice, world wars, economic depressions, despotic regimes, 
depletion of natural resources and other contemporary problems.   
After the WWII, instead of being wholly rejected, developmental model gained a 
new life in the world culture of the post-war era.  Development as an essentialized 
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unilineal form was largely preserved.  Its teleology, though widely discredited in 
academic thoughts (e.g., Nisbet 1969; Popper 1957, 1971; Thornton 2005; Tilly 1984; 
Wallerstein 1991), remained traceable in the foregrounds of social policy and lay 
understanding (e.g., Allendorf 2013; Chabbott 1999;  Ferguson 1999; Latham 2000; 
Osella and Osella 2006; Pigg 1992).  Its obviously harmful implications (e.g., racism, 
radical nationalism) were removed, with its content now concentrated on values that were 
believed to be universal to all mankind—values such as health, literacy, and standard of 
living (e.g., Sen 2000; United Nations Development Programme 1990-2013).  In addition, 
the new conception of national development left cultural idiosyncrasies out of its scope—
that is, development remains a single dimension, but it represents universal human 
wellbeing and does not claim to reduce everything to this single dimension.   
To sum up, today’s schema of national development can be understood, in a 
social scientific manner, as a continuous or at least ordinal variable.  The unit of analysis 
is usually the nation-state (but see Frank et al. 2000).  Though stagnation and 
retrogression are allowed as undeniable empirical facts, there is usually strong advocacy 
for forward movement, sometimes with a teleological rhetoric.  As a composite 
dimension, national development addresses the welfare of the people, such as longevity, 
education, and material well-being, which are assessed with social scientific data 
provided by national accounting systems.  Nevertheless, plenty of social attributes that 
have no intrinsic relations with human welfare have taken free rides with the idea of 
societal development, including but not limited to familial attributes like later marriage 
and low fertility (Thornton 2005; Thornton et al. 2012a, c), and even income inequality 
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(Xie et al. 2012).  As it was explicitly rationalized on the basis of public good and social 
science, this schema of national development has become a central part of the culture of a 
new world society during the post-war era (Meyer 2010).  
 
2.2.3 Individual-level Prevalence  
Today’s schema of national development is clearly a human construct.  However, once 
formed, the idea transcends particular individual agents and acquires its own life.  We 
argue that the schema of national development is now prevalent on a global basis as part 
of world culture.  World society theory is strongly predictive of consensus and 
homogenization (Meyer et al. 1997a).  Resting on the tradition of sociological 
institutionalism which assumes the primacy of contextual influences of macro 
environment, world society theory champions causal attributions to macro-level cultural 
processes.  Essentially, it posits worldwide subsistence of various highly rationalized 
cultural models (e.g., schema on national development, but also those on nature, national 
order, human rights, and life course), which provide identities, legitimacy, blueprints, and 
guidelines for actors at different levels (i.e., nation-states, organizations, individuals) 
around the world.  As actors are all embedded in and trained by the same exogenous 
world culture, they are predicted to show a considerable amount of agreement upon the 
nature and value of major substantive matters.   
Such consensus, of course, does not mean complete homogeneity and often is in 
principle only—when local actors’ motivations conflict with world culture principles, 
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decoupling between purpose and practice is common (e.g., Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 
2005; Levitt and Merry 2009).  However, for the most part, as world culture gained great 
institutional authority in most countries (e.g., law, public policy, school curriculum, 
INGO advocacy), its cultural models have constructed similar realities across the world.  
For example, researchers have found worldwide similarities in missions and structures 
among state organizations (Meyer et al. 1997a) and international associations (Boli and 
Thomas 1999); also, there have been extensive adoptions of mass schooling (Meyer et al. 
1992), population control policies (Barrett and Frank 1999), and human rights principles 
(Elliot 2007; Koo and Ramirez 2009).   
Specifically, the rise and prevalence of national development model among states 
and organizations has been well documented (e.g., Chabbott 1999; Hall 1989; Latham 
2000).  We now go further down to the individual level and propose the following 
hypothesis according to the theory.   
Hypothesis 1: In general, individuals around the world show strong 
conformity to world culture’s schema of national development, though 
considerable amount of heterogeneity exists.     
 
2.2.4 Mechanisms of Diffusion  
In the world society literature, the two topics that have been most written on were 
education and organization (Cf. bibliography compiled by Boli et al. 2009).  What make 
them special are their crucial roles in bridging world culture scripts and the actors (Meyer 
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2009: 46).  In other words, it was through educational and organizational pathways 
(among others) that world culture exerted influences on various actors at different levels.  
Mass education, which itself is an enactment of world culture and thus highly globalized 
and isomorphic (Schofer and Meyer 2005; Frank and Meyer 2007; Meyer et al.1992), 
was found to have adopted similar curricula in many diverse countries (Benavot 1992; 
Kamens et al. 1996; McEneaney and Meyer 2000).  Besides a scientific understanding of 
nature, school curricula also cover materials that reflect social rationality and public good 
(e.g., Cha et al. 1988; Meyer et al. 1992; Wong 1991), such as more inclusive world 
history (Frank et al. 1994; Frank et al. 2000), international communication (Cha 1991), 
individualism (Meyer 2006), and human rights (Ramirez et al. 2006; Suárez 2007).  In 
particular, the rationalized schema of national development, as a central concept in world 
culture, has been tightly associated with education (Chabbott 2003).  Given the 
population coverage, formal education is likely to be the most penetrative mechanism 
that distributes world culture’s schema of national development among ordinary 
individuals around the world, which leads to our second hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: School education increases one’s conformity to world 
culture’s schema of national development.    
Besides education, an equally dramatic and standardized expansion has taken 
place in the field of international organizations (Boli and Thomas 1997; Drori et al. 2006).  
Established on hyper-rationalized world culture principles, they permeated through 
national boundaries and spread ideas, resources, and actions among participatory 
individuals (e.g., Boli and Thomas 1997).  Such international associational processes had 
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been particularly active under the theme of national development (Chabbott 1999).  In 
terms of influence, it was argued that corporate structures of state bureaucracies, business 
companies, and families all have declined relative to this society of international 
organizations.  Of course, international organizations are not possibly comparable to 
education in individual-level density of influence—most people go to school but only a 
fraction of people are directly involved in international organizations’ activities.  
Therefore, while education functions directly on individuals, international organizations 
are usually conceptualized at the country level as the country’s linkage to the world 
society, which then influences individuals living in that country in a cross-level manner 
(Givens and Jorgenson 2013; McAdam and Rucht 1993; Meyer et al. 1997a: 161).   
Hypothesis 3: The country’s connection to world society, as 
operationalized as population-adjusted number of international 
organizations, positively influences its citizens’ conformity to world 
culture’s schema of national development.   
 
2.3 Data and Methods  
2.3.1 Data   
We use data from an international survey program referred to as Developmental Idealism 
Studies (Thornton et al. 2010).  One of the main purposes of the program is to examine 
the understanding of development by common individuals in different societies.  Our 
analysis is based on twelve studies in eight diverse countries, including Argentina, 
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Bulgaria, China, Egypt, Lebanon, Malawi, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S.  All studies were 
conducted between 2006 and 2011, yielding nationally representative adult samples 
except for Argentina, China, and Malawi.  In Argentina, the sampling frame included 
urban agglomerates with at least 500,000 residents.  In China, a random sample was 
collected in Gansu Province.  The Malawi sample consists of male respondents only, who 
were mostly married and living in rural Kuntumanji in Zomba District.  National studies 
were done twice in Lebanon in 2008 and 2011, and twice in the U.S. in 2006 and 2007.  
In Bulgaria, three versions of questionnaires were randomly administered to three 
national samples of equal size, yielding three independent samples (see Melegh et al. 
2012).  The sizes of raw country samples vary from 336 (Bulgaria samples) to 3,496 
(Egypt) and add up to 16,156 cases in total.  After data restriction, the analytic country 
sample sizes range from 199 (Bulgaria) to 2,818 (Lebanon 2008).  Collectively, the 
pooled analytic sample contains a total of 13,851 individuals.  Descriptive statistics of all 
twelve study samples are summarized in Tables 2.1a.   
[Table 2.1a] 
 
2.3.2 Dependent Variables 
The major concept of interest of this paper is individual conformity to world culture’s 
schema of national development.  As a relational concept, its measurement necessarily 
involves two pieces of information—individual perception of national development 
around the world and the world culture version.  The first component can be directly 
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obtained from Developmental Idealism Studies.  We posit that lay people generally 
assume an essentialized, one-dimensional, and quantitative understanding (i.e., one single 
continuous variable) of national development.  To reveal such understanding, in each 
study the respondents were asked to rate the levels of development of a set of countries 
using a numeric value from 0 to 10.
1
  Respondents from the same study rated the same set 
of countries, but the rated countries varied across studies (Cf. Appendix Table 2.1).  As it 
turned out, an overwhelming majority (87.3%) of all 16,156 respondents complied and 
willingly rated all the countries included in the surveys.  The study-specific ratings full-
response rates are reported in Table 2.1a.  It is worth noting that lower response rates are 
strongly associated with higher numbers of countries to be rated (Cf. Table 2.1b), and 
therefore might be due to survey fatigue rather than genuine resistance to the quantitative 
conception of national development.  Thus, for each of the responding individuals a 
quantitative perception of the development levels of multiple countries is obtained on an 
interval scale.   
But it is not individuals’ perceptions per se that we are interested in.  What we 
care about is to what extent those perceptions are influenced by world culture.  To find 
this out, we need a world culture yardstick for comparison.  The United Nation’s Human 
Development Index (HDI) provides such a yardstick.  The United Nations itself was a 
product of world culture and has functioned as one of its most authoritative agents 
(Chabbott 1999).  Since 1990, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in 
                                                          
1 In four studies (Egypt 2011, Lebanon 2008, Lebanon 2011, and Saudi Arabia 2011), respondents were asked to 
perform the task using the scale 1-10.  For standardization, those ratings were all rescaled to 0-10.   
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the spirit of world culture, has been computing and publishing HDI scores for all 
countries in the world (Sen 2000; United Nations Development Programme 1990-2013).  
The HDI is a one-dimensional numerical measure reduced from three key developmental 
themes of contemporary nation-states—health, education, and standard of living.  Its 
construction is based on data produced by national accounting systems.  It has been used 
to evaluate different countries’ achievement of national developmental goals.  It also 
enables cross-sectional country comparisons that lead to national developmental 
hierarchies.  Thus, the HDI score provides an ideal approximation of world culture’s 
schema of national development.   
Consequently, for each individual respondent, we have two vectors of national 
development—one consisting of her own ratings of a number of countries and the other 
consisting of HDI scores for the same set of countries, both on interval scales and 
restricted to the range 0-10 (see Appendix Table 2.1 for the parallel structure).  To assess 
the world culture’s impact on individuals’ perceptions—in other words, individuals’ 
conformity to world culture’s schema of national development—we need to measure the 
concordance pattern between the two vectors.  To do so, we regressed each respondent’s 
rating scores on United Nations’ HDI scores.  That is, each individual yields a mini 
sample—the units of analysis are the rated countries, and the number of rated countries is 
the sample size.  As a result, for each individual we retrieved a regression coefficient 
(slope), which was interpreted as the amount of change in her rating in response to one 
unit increase in the HDI rating.  With such interpretation, the slope coefficient naturally 
represents one’s conformity to world culture’s developmental schema.  For each 
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individual, we estimated such a bivariate regression and recorded the slope coefficient, 
which we named “raw conformity score” and treated it as a continuous variable 
indicating one’s degree of conformity to world culture’s schema of national development.   
Thus constructed, the raw conformity score has the advantage of natural 
interpretation.  However, as is standard with regression analysis, the slope is affected by 
the respondent’s idiosyncratic scale of her rating scheme.  For example, if one’s 
evaluative system conceives one-unit difference twice as significant as one-unit 
difference in HDI rating, she would seem less responsive to world culture’s schema of 
national development even if her ratings are perfectly correlated with the HDI ratings.  
To solve this problem, we also calculated standardized regression coefficient for each 
respondent, which we called “standardized conformity score”.  The standardization 
procedure cancelled the scale difference between individual respondent’s ratings and the 
HDI scores.  The relationship between the two sets of scores is now interpreted on 
standard deviation basis.  We note that, mathematically, the standardized regression 
coefficient in a bivariate regression is simply Pearson’s correlation coefficient.  Although 
the correlation coefficient is free from the scale problem, it loses the property of 
directional interpretation—it measures the co-varying patterns between respondents’ 
ratings and HDI scores, rather than how the former depend on the latter.  
While this paper is the first to apply regression slope to measure the concordance 
between survey ratings and HDI scores, previous literature on developmental hierarchies 
has used Pearson’s correlation as an indicator for proximity between the two scores 
(Binstock et al. forthcoming; Melegh et al. 2012; Thornton et al. 2012c; Xie et al. 2012).  
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We emphasize that the raw (slope) and standardized (correlation) conformity scores have 
advantages and disadvantages.  This paper adopts both to capitalize on the raw score’s 
interpretation property as well as the standardized score’s measurement property.  In 
addition, by including both we provide a robust check for our findings.  
The HDI scores and the averages of respondents’ ratings are summarized in the 
Appendix Table 2.1. The distributions of raw and standardized conformity scores for 
each study are reported in Table 2.2, which gives straightforward answers to our first 
hypothesis.  They were also used as the dependent variables in the tests for the second 
and third hypotheses. 
 
2.3.3 Key Independent Variables  
Our key independent variables measure two diffusion mechanisms of world culture—
education at the individual level (H2), and the nation’s linkage to the world society at the 
societal level (H3).  Most education variables in the original survey data measure the 
highest levels of educational attainment.  As educational credentials in different countries 
were not entirely comparable, all of the education variables were harmonized to years of 
schooling.  
Hypothesis 3 has to do with the degree to which the study site is integrated into 
the world society.  We operationalized this concept with the number of international 
organizations per thousand population.  As world culture models were explicitly 
theorized to have spread through cultural and associational processes (Meyer et al. 
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1997a), the number of associational connections have been commonly used in previous 
empirical studies of world society (e.g., Tsutsui 2004), with higher values meaning 
tighter connection between a country and the world society above.  The international 
organization data were based on various issues of the Yearbook of International 
Organizations published by the Union of International Associations (2007-2012).   
 
2.3.4 Control Variables  
Our analysis included both personal and study-specific control variables.  At the 
individual level, we controlled for age and gender, where male is coded 1 and female 0.   
At the study level, rather than simply estimating fixed effects for each study, we 
included four control variables—import/GDP ratio, logged GDP per capita, number of 
countries rated, and a dummy variable for Muslim-majority countries (Cf. Table 2.1b).  
These covariates account for two major sources of heterogeneity at the study level—the 
twelve studies took place in different country-year regimes of different socioeconomic 
characteristics, and in each study the conformity score was operationalized using 
different materials (albeit with the same methodology).  
The import/GDP ratios (in percentage) were retrieved from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators database to measure the countries’ economic dependence 
on the world economy.  We also included logged GDP per capita, which can be 
interpreted as the country’s average standard of living at the time of data collection.  The 
unit of measurement is standardized to be purchase power adjusted constant 2005 U.S. 
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dollars, so that the values are comparable between countries and over years.  Data on 
GDP per capita for all country-years come from Penn World Table Version 7.1 (Heston 
et al. 2012).   
Besides regime characteristics, study design effects also need to be taken into 
consideration because respondents in different studies were asked to rate different sets of 
countries (though with considerable overlap), and the number of rated countries varied 
across studies.  The number of rated countries was easily controlled for.  The difficulty 
lies in the qualitative differences among the different sets of rated countries, but we were 
nevertheless able to control for a most striking pattern—namely, studies conducted in 
Muslim-majority countries (i.e., Egypt, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia) rated essentially the 
same countries, which disproportionately came from the Islamic world (Cf. Appendix 
Table 2.1).  How would this change the results is unknown, but it is highly likely to be a 
source of systematic variation in the outcome.  Therefore, a dummy indicator was created 
to mark out the studies done in Muslim-majority countries.   
[Table 2.1b] 
 
2.3.5 Analytic Procedures 
Our statistical analysis consists of three components.  First, we computed raw and 
standardized conformity score for each of the 13,851 respondents who answered all the 
development rating questions and socio-demographic questions (i.e., age, gender, 
education).  We examined the distributive properties of the conformity scores (Cf. Table 
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2.2) to assess the level of individual conformity to world culture’s schema of national 
development (H1).  Second, for each of the twelve study samples, a regression model was 
estimated to predict raw and standardized conformity scores with age, gender, and 
education (Cf. Tables 2.3a and 2.3b).  We did so to examine study-specific relationships 
between the conformity level and people’s sociodemographic features.  Finally, we 
conducted analyses with the pooled sample.  To test the diffusion mechanisms, 
conformity score is regressed on years of education (H2) and population-adjusted number 
of international organizations (H3) with controls at both individual and study levels (Cf. 
Table 4).   
When analyzing the pooled data, two decisions were made.  First, the small 
number of study-level units (i.e., twelve) ruled out the possibility to model mixture 
distributions for multilevel analysis.  Instead, we estimated cluster standard errors to 
adjust for the clustering effects at the study level.  Second, we weighted the twelve 
samples to have equal size impacts, so that the results would not be over-dominated by 
studies with large sample sizes.   
 
2.4 Results  
Our results are summarized in Figures 2.1a and 2.1b, and Tables 2.2-2.4.  Figures 2.1a 
and 2.2b visualize the distributions of raw and standardized conformity scores, 
respectively, for each study using box plots.  Table 2.2 summarizes the mean, standard 
deviation, and median of those distributions.  Table 2.3a reports study-specific 
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regressions with individual-level predictors, showing the effects of age, gender, and 
education on the raw conformity score in each study.  Table 2.3b reports the same 
findings on the standardized conformity scores.  Table 2.4 summarizes the findings based 
on the pooled sample, which include both individual-level and study-level processes.   
 
2.4.1 Distributions of Raw and Standardized Conformity Scores 
Based on the conformity scores computed as described above, we interpret the direction 
and magnitude of world culture’s influence on individuals’ perception of national 
development.  As standardization does not change the sign of regression coefficient, the 
raw and standardized conformity scores have the same directions, which are mostly 
positive in all twelve studies (Cf. the last column of Table 2.2).  Not surprisingly, each 
study has a minority of non-conformers, who rated countries in some opposite ways to 
how the UN did and ended up with negative conformity scores.  However, positive scores 
prevail in all studies, with sample proportions ranging from 91.1% to 99.5%.  This means 
that most individuals everywhere conform to world culture’s developmental schema.   
The scores are also high in level.  As both respondents’ ratings and HDI scores 
were set to the same range 0-10, a raw score around 1 could be interpreted as perfect 1:1 
conformity.  However, due to inconsistent scales between survey ratings and HDI scores, 
raw conformity scores are not theoretically bounded to a closed interval.  When 
individuals’ responses are extremely sensitive to HDI scores (whose ratings respond to 
HDI scores but shift by a greater level), the raw conformity score can exceed 1 or fall 
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below -1.  In fact, in ten out of twelve samples, the third quartile of raw conformity score 
exceeds 1 (Cf. Figure 2.1a).  As shown in Table 2.2, the mean levels of raw scores range 
from 0.52 to 1.12, and medians from 0.49 to 1.10.  Intuition tells us that these represent 
strong conformities, but to resolve the scale issue, we now move on to the standardized 
scores.  Comparing Figures 2.1a and 2.1b, we can see that although the proportions above 
and below zero remain the same, the standardized scores are compressed between -1 and 
1, as a result of re-centering and re-scaling, and therefore become more comparable 
across studies (note that since this is bivariate analysis, the standardized regression 
coefficients are mathematically equivalent to Pearson’s correlations).  After 
standardization, the mean conformity scores range from 0.47 to 0.79, and medians from 
0.51 to 0.83.  Given the theoretical boundaries of -1 and 1, these values clearly indicate 
moderately strong to very strong concordances.   
[Table 2.2] 
 [Figure 2.1a] [Figure 2.1b] 
 Overall, these results support our first hypothesis that individuals’ perceptions of 
national development are effectively constructed by world culture.  For example, in our 
2011 Egypt sample, individuals’ ratings on development closely correlated with HDI 
scores (average correlation = 0.62), where one unit increase in HDI score would shift 
respondents’ ratings up by an average of 0.89 point.  Based on our Table 2.2, similar 
evidence can be seen in all other studies.  
 
   
25 
 
2.4.2 Influences of Education and Linkage to World Society 
Given immense social heterogeneity at the individual level, consensus can only be a 
matter of degree.  World culture theory predicts high levels of consensus but not 
complete absence of variation.  Indeed, our conformity scores are mostly positive and 
large, yet there are also considerable amounts of variation.  We now turn to capitalize on 
these variations to test the diffusion mechanisms that get the developmental schema into 
individual persons’ heads.  To achieve this, we estimated regression models predicting 
conformity scores using independent variables at both individual and study levels.   
We first examine study-specific results.  We do so because our outcome variables, 
conformity scores, are constructed in a study-specific manner (i.e., calculations based on 
different sets of countries).  For each study, we estimated two regression models 
predicting raw and standardized conformity scores, respectively, with three identical 
individual-level independent variables—gender, age, and years of education.  Results of 
the twenty-four regressions are summarized in Tables 2.3a and 2.3b.  While the effects of 
sex and age are rather mixed and statistically insignificant in a majority of studies, years 
of education are consistently positive and mostly statistically significant.  Note that the 
effects due to education are reported in single-year metric, the effect sizes of education 
are more appreciable than the coefficients seem to be.  By a factor of 10, the influences of 
education outperform practically all the effects due to maleness or 10 years of age.     
The above findings yield two conclusions.  First, our second hypothesis, that 
school education contributes importantly to the diffusion of developmental ideas and 
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hence stronger individual conformity to world culture’s schema of national development, 
gains support.  The second conclusion is less definitive—although the conformity scores 
in different samples are generated with different sets of rated countries, it is very likely 
that they have measured the same construct, as they show relatively comparable 
relationships with individual sociodemographic traits, particularly education.  Therefore, 
we see no compelling reasons that prevent further analysis using the pooled sample, to 
which we now turn.   
 [Table 2.3a] [Table 2.3b] 
Table 2.4 reports the results of regression models based on the pooled sample.  
Now that we have merged all twelve samples, variations at both the individual and study 
levels can be identified.  This allows us to include not only individual traits but also 
study-specific variables as independent variables.  Two regression models were 
estimated—one predicting the raw conformity score and the other predicting the 
standardized score.  As discussed above, we estimated cluster standard errors to correct 
for the clustering effect at the study level.  Also, the samples were weighted to have equal 
sizes to avoid dominance by large samples.   
For the raw score model, the theoretically interesting predictors—years of 
education and logged number of international organizations per thousand population—
both operate in the expected positive direction, and are both statistically significant at the 
0.001 alpha-level.  Net of covariates, one year of education would increase the raw 
conformity score by 0.016 points.  At the same time, an 100% increase in the number of 
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international organizations per thousand population would drive the raw conformity score 
up by 0.097 points.   
For the standardized score model, the coefficients on education and international 
organizations remain positive but shrink in magnitude.  One year of education would 
increase the standardized conformity score by 0.009 points, and doubling the number of 
international organizations would increase the standardized conformity score by 0.025 
points.  In addition, the standard error for the international organization effect increases 
substantially but it remains significant at 0.5 level.  
Since the independent variables are measured on many different metrics, it is 
difficult to compare their effect sizes based on the values of coefficients.  To get a better 
idea of their distinct contributions, we also computed incremental R
2
s (denoted ∆R2 in 
Table 2.4) to examine their net explanatory powers.  For the raw score model, for 
example, to determine how much variation is uniquely attributable to education, we 
calculate the difference between the R
2
 of the full model and the R
2
 of the model with all 
predictors but the education variable.  This way, we identified an incremental R
2
 of 
1.49% for education, which means 1.49% of the variation in raw conformity score are 
accounted for by the variation in years of education, net of other independent variables.  
As shown in Table 2.4, the two largest net explanatory powers were due to number of 
international organizations (∆R2 = 3.21%) and years of education (∆R2 = 1.49%).  For the 
standardized score model, the ∆R2 is 1.72% for education and 0.77% for international 
organizations, which are smaller only than that of import/GDP ratio (2.72%).  Once again, 
we find that education and international organizations make important differences.   
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Taken together, we may conclude that, consistent with our Hypotheses 2 and 3, 
years of education and the nation’s linkage to the world have important impacts on 
individuals’ conformity to world culture’s schema of national development.   
  [Table 2.4] 
 
2.5 Conclusions and Discussion  
World society theory posits (relative) consensus on such matters as development, science, 
and human rights among actors at aggregate as well as individual levels.  While much 
work has been done at the state or organizational levels, this paper offers the first 
empirical support for the individual presence of world culture’s schema of national 
development.  Drawing on survey data from twelve studies in eight diverse countries, we 
have shown that lay people around the world were able to apply the rationalized concept 
of development to evaluate different countries in very similar ways as the United Nations, 
an authoritative agent of the world culture.     
World society theory also offers a diffusion model to account for the 
dissemination of rationalized cultural scripts among actors.  Our paper conducted tests on 
the two most theorized and empirically assessed pathways of world culture diffusion—
school education and a society’s connection to the world society.  Consistent with 
previous literature (e.g., Baker and LeTendre 2005, Givens and Jorgenson 2013; Tsutsui 
2004), both mechanisms were found to be important factors contributing to individual 
conformity to world culture’s developmental schema.   
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For a study on world culture, the ideal aggregate-level sampling frame would 
include all countries in all post-war years.  Given a reasonably large random sample of 
country-years from such a spatial-temporal universe, we would be able to estimate 
mixture models (i.e., multilevel analysis).  However, we have only twelve data points 
based on eight countries between 2006 and 2011, which makes it impossible to make 
statistical inferences to the ideal universe.  In other words, our findings are confined to 
the specific eight countries in those specific years.  However, within those boundaries, 
our sample results are generalizable to the population at the individual level.   
Another analytic problem to be solved in the future is the reliance on cross-
sectional surveys (albeit repeated ones in Bulgaria, Lebanon, and the U.S.), which 
unavoidably invokes concerns about endogeneity—is one’s conformity to world culture’s 
developmental schema the cause or effect of her education and her country’s number of 
international organizations?  Panel data might be helpful in answering causal questions, 
but a more fundamental issue is that world society theory does imply recursive causations.  
By treating conformity score as the outcome, we aim to provide tests for its diffusion 
mechanisms.  Can the analytic direction be reversed?  Yes, but then the question would 
be about the effectiveness of individual agency (i.e., individual commitment in 
developmental ideas) in promoting her own educational attainment and her country’s 
integration into the world society, which goes beyond the scope of this paper.   
Such being the case, world culture scholars have repeatedly emphasized the rise 
of individual actorhood.  In a recent review article, Meyer (2010) pointed out the stateless 
tendency of the world polity in the post-war period, and proposed that individual persons 
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were increasingly legitimated as the “primordial actor.”  So far, empirical research on 
individual actorhood—including this paper—have mainly focused on how world culture 
trained the individuals.  Now that individuals become equipped with various rationalized 
cultural scripts, they are bound to play an increasingly significant role in the enactment of 
world culture, which provides great promise for future empirical work.   
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Figure 2.1a. The distribution of raw conformity scores, by study
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
A
R
08
B
G
09
.1
B
G
09
.2
B
G
09
.3
C
N
07
E
G
11
LB
08
LB
11
M
L0
9
S
A
11
U
S
06
U
S
07
Source: Developmental Idealism Studies, 2006-2011.
Figure 2.1b. The distribution of standardized conformity scores, by study
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Table 2.1a. Desriptive statistics of individual-level variables, by study
Male 
Mean SD Mean SD (%) Mean SD Mean SD
Argentina 2008 1,003 93.0 897 0.94 0.36 0.75 0.20 48.3 41.4 16.3 11.0 3.5
Bulgaria 2009-A 336 60.7 204 0.81 0.36 0.57 0.19 54.9 51.2 14.5 12.1 3.2
Bulgaria 2009-B 336 59.2 199 0.67 0.32 0.57 0.21 54.3 49.6 14.5 11.8 3.3
Bulgaria 2009-C 336 65.2 219 0.81 0.29 0.61 0.16 48.4 49.4 15.0 11.9 3.6
China 2007 633 99.1 625 0.52 0.39 0.56 0.32 44.8 43.1 13.7 7.3 3.5
Egypt 2011 3,496 73.7 2,576 0.89 0.44 0.62 0.23 56.3 37.8 14.1 9.3 5.5
Lebanon 2008 3,039 94.1 2,818 1.12 0.78 0.47 0.27 56.1 32.7 12.9 12.4 4.2
Lebanon 2011 3,039 88.8 2,594 1.05 0.51 0.66 0.23 60.6 35.1 12.6 12.5 3.4
Malawi 2009 955 99.3 936 0.74 0.39 0.55 0.26 100.0 32.9 6.5 5.9 3.6
Saudi Arabia 2011 2,003 95.0 1,849 0.87 0.57 0.56 0.31 51.1 33.6 13.2 11.3 3.4
United States 2006 486 96.7 463 0.85 0.31 0.79 0.17 45.1 51.1 16.8 14.1 2.5
United States 2007 494 96.4 471 0.79 0.36 0.64 0.22 43.3 52.3 16.0 14.2 2.4
Pooled sample 16,156 87.3 13,851 0.84 0.47 0.61 0.25 55.3 42.5 14.6 11.2 4.3
Notes: The pooled sample is weighted so that all studies have equal impacts.  
Source: Developmental Idealism Studies, 2006-2011. 
Standardized        
conformity score
Age
Years of 
education
Raw      
N
Ratings       
full-response 
rate (%)
Analytic 
N
Raw       
conformity score
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Table 2.1b. Summary of study-level variables, by study
Argentina 2008 0.135 20.7 11,483 10 No 
Bulgaria 2009-A 0.624 56.3 10,399 14 No 
Bulgaria 2009-B 0.624 56.3 10,399 14 No 
Bulgaria 2009-C 0.624 56.3 10,399 14 No 
China 2007 0.003 29.6 5,512 9 No 
Egypt 2011 0.049 30.2 4,854 9 Yes
Lebanon 2008 0.532 53.5 11,335 7 Yes
Lebanon 2011 0.543 50.4 12,700 9 Yes
Malawi 2009 0.099 39.0 619 10 No 
Saudi Arabia 2011 0.081 30.6 20,189 9 Yes
United States 2006 0.033 16.8 43,215 10 No 
United States 2007 0.033 17.0 43,512 12 No 
Sources:  
a
 Yearbook of International Organizations (2007-2012)
              
b
 World Development Indicators (2006-2011). 
              
c
 Penn World Table (V7.1). 
              
d
 Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life (2009).
Muslim-majortiy 
country 
d
Number of IO 
a 
per thousand 
population
Import/GDP                  
(×100) b
GDP per capita 
(PPP USD, 2005) 
c
Number of     
countries rated
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Table 2.2. The distribution of raw and standardized conformity scores, by study 
Mean SD Median Mean SD Median
Argentina 2008 0.94 0.36 0.96 0.75 0.20 0.80 98.8
Bulgaria 2009-A 0.81 0.36 0.78 0.57 0.19 0.61 99.0
Bulgaria 2009-B 0.67 0.32 0.66 0.57 0.21 0.62 98.5
Bulgaria 2009-C 0.81 0.29 0.81 0.61 0.16 0.64 99.5
China 2007 0.52 0.39 0.49 0.56 0.32 0.65 93.8
Egypt 2011 0.89 0.44 0.89 0.62 0.23 0.67 97.4
Lebanon 2008 1.12 0.78 1.10 0.47 0.27 0.51 91.1
Lebanon 2011 1.05 0.51 1.09 0.66 0.23 0.71 97.3
Malawi 2009 0.74 0.39 0.79 0.55 0.26 0.61 96.0
Saudi Arabia 2011 0.87 0.57 0.90 0.56 0.31 0.66 92.9
United States 2006 0.85 0.31 0.85 0.79 0.17 0.83 98.9
United States 2007 0.79 0.36 0.81 0.64 0.22 0.68 98.3
Source: Developmental Idealism Studies, 2006-2011.
% 
positive
Raw score Standardized score
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Table 2.3a. Regression models predicting raw conformity score, by study
R
2
(%)
s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e.
Argentina 2009 0.038 0.023 0.027 *** 0.007 0.020 *** 0.004 0.588 *** 0.058 4.23
Bulgaria 2009-A 0.016 0.035 -0.047 ** 0.012 0.004 0.006 1.001 *** 0.101 3.94
Bulgaria 2009-B 0.026 0.032 0.017 0.011 0.021 ** 0.005 0.331 ** 0.088 4.68
Bulgaria 2009-C 0.007 0.039 0.013 0.013 0.016 ** 0.006 0.558 *** 0.101 3.90
China 2007 0.077 * 0.031 0.014 0.012 0.030 *** 0.005 0.211 ** 0.073 8.18
Egypt 2011 0.048 ** 0.018 0.004 0.007 0.005 ** 0.002 0.802 *** 0.034 0.77
Lebanon 2008 -0.080 ** 0.030 0.036 ** 0.012 0.018 *** 0.004 0.824 *** 0.070 1.19
Lebanon 2011 0.018 0.020 -0.024 ** 0.008 0.026 *** 0.003 0.795 *** 0.055 4.05
Malawi 2009 (omitted) 0.032 0.020 0.013 *** 0.004 0.561 *** 0.075 1.46
Saudi Arabia 2011 0.122 *** 0.027 -0.003 0.011 -0.004 0.004 0.868 *** 0.069 1.12
United States 2006 0.023 0.028 0.027 ** 0.008 0.034 *** 0.006 0.225 * 0.095 8.68
United States 2007 0.108 ** 0.032 0.021 * 0.010 0.033 *** 0.007 0.167 0.112 7.99
Note: * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001. 
Source: Developmental Idealism Studies, 2006-2011.
Male (ref. = female) Age (×10) Years of education Intercept 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
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Table 2.3b. Regression models predicting standardized conformity score, by study
R
2
(%)
s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e.
Argentina 2009 0.032 * 0.013 0.013 ** 0.004 0.011 *** 0.002 0.560 *** 0.033 4.23
Bulgaria 2009-A -0.031 0.026 -0.025 ** 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.716 *** 0.075 2.86
Bulgaria 2009-B 0.002 0.030 0.006 0.010 0.014 ** 0.005 0.370 *** 0.083 2.16
Bulgaria 2009-C -0.006 0.022 0.002 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.561 *** 0.057 0.61
China 2007 0.069 ** 0.026 0.002 0.010 0.023 *** 0.004 0.354 *** 0.060 7.97
Egypt 2011 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.003 *** 0.001 0.560 *** 0.018 0.73
Lebanon 2008 0.003 0.010 0.008 * 0.004 0.007 *** 0.001 0.359 *** 0.024 1.02
Lebanon 2011 0.008 0.009 -0.015 *** 0.004 0.009 *** 0.001 0.587 *** 0.025 3.21
Malawi 2009 (omitted) 0.033 * 0.013 0.014 *** 0.002 0.354 *** 0.049 3.70
Saudi Arabia 2011 0.043 ** 0.014 -0.001 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.524 *** 0.037 0.57
United States 2006 0.001 0.015 0.003 0.005 0.024 *** 0.003 0.436 *** 0.053 11.53
United States 2007 0.048 * 0.020 0.009 0.006 0.028 *** 0.004 0.177 * 0.069 10.47
Note: * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001. 
Source: Developmental Idealism Studies, 2006-2011.
Male (ref. = female) Age (×10) Years of education Intercept 
Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef.
 
 
 
   
45 
 
Table 2.4. Regression models predicting raw and standardized conformity scores using pooled data
ΔR 2 (%) ΔR 2 (%)
Individual-level variables 
Male (ref. = female) 0.031 0.10 0.012 0.05
Age (×10) 0.011 0.12 0.003 0.02
Years of education 0.016 *** 1.49 0.009 ** 1.72
Study-level variables 
Logged number of IOs per thousand population 0.097 *** 3.21 0.025 * 0.77
    
Import/GDP (×100) -0.005 *** 0.59 -0.005 * 2.72
Logged GDP per capita -0.007 0.02 -0.004 0.01
Number of countries rated -0.044 *** 1.16 -0.001 0.00
Muslim-majority country 0.052 0.09 -0.044 0.21
Intercept 1.477 *** 0.796 ***
R
2
(%)
Notes: All analyses are performed with the weighted pooled sample so that all component studies have equal impacts on the pooled outcome.
           Clustered robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
          * p  < 0.05, ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001. 
Source: Developmental Idealism Studies, 2006-2011.
(0.117)
11.46
Standardized scoreRaw score
(0.002)
Coef.
(0.016)
(0.007)
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.035)
8.71
(0.160)
(0.051)
(0.008)
Coef.
(0.015)
(0.014)
(0.011)
(0.004)
(0.002)
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Appendix Table 2.1. United Nations Human Development Indices (HDI) and mean ratings of development, by study
Rated country HDI Mean HDI Mean HDI Mean HDI Mean HDI Mean HDI Mean HDI Mean HDI Mean HDI Mean HDI Mean HDI Mean HDI Mean
Albania 7.2 3.3
Argentina 7.7 5.6
Armenia 6.9 3.9
Austria 8.5 7.8
Azerbaijan 7.1 3.6
Belarus 7.3 4.5
Bosnia/Herzegovina 7.1 4.2
Brazil 6.9 6.6 6.9 5.6 6.9 6.7 6.8 6.1 6.9 5.7
Bulgaria 7.4 3.4 7.4 3.3 7.4 3.2 7.3 4.5
Central Africa Republic 3.1 3.5 3.1 3.5 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.1 4.8 3.0 3.3 3.1 3.5
China 6.5 7.8 6.4 7.1 6.9 8.8 6.5 7.9 6.6 7.6 6.9 8.0 6.3 7.4 6.4 6.9
Congo 4.8 5.1
Croatia 7.7 5.0
Czech Republic 8.4 5.8
Denmark 8.6 7.7
Egypt 6.4 5.5 6.4 3.2 6.4 4.8 5.9 5.5
England 8.5 8.2
France 8.7 7.8 8.7 7.7 8.6 6.6 8.8 8.0 8.7 8.2 8.8 8.0 8.7 7.1 8.8 8.3 8.6 7.3
Georgia 7.0 3.9
Germany 8.8 8.4
Hungary 8.0 6.0
India 5.1 3.7 5.1 4.6 5.1 4.3 5.1 4.4 5.0 5.2 5.1 6.2 4.9 5.4 5.0 5.0
Iran 7.1 5.7 6.9 6.2 7.1 6.2 7.1 6.0
Italy 8.5 7.2
Japan 8.8 8.8 8.8 7.1 8.8 7.7 8.8 8.9 8.8 8.6
Kyrgyzstan 5.9 3.4
Lebanon 7.3 4.4 7.4 4.4
Malawi 3.8 2.6
Netherlands 8.9 6.3
Nigeria 4.2 3.6 4.2 3.3 4.2 3.5 4.2 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.2 6.0 4.1 3.2
Norway 9.4 7.3
Pakistan 4.8 3.9 4.8 5.1 4.7 4.1 4.8 4.0
Poland 7.9 5.8
Portrugal 7.9 6.0
Russia 7.1 7.1 7.0 5.9
Saudi Arabia 7.7 6.8 7.5 4.4 7.7 5.2 7.7 6.4 7.4 5.6
Slovakia 8.2 5.4
Slovenia 8.3 5.6
South Africa 5.9 7.1
Spain 8.6 7.1
Sudan 4.1 3.8 4.1 2.3 4.1 4.1
Sweden 8.8 8.4 8.9 7.4
Switzerland 8.7 8.8
Syria 5.8 3.9
Tajikistan 5.8 3.3
Turkey 6.7 5.5
United Arab Emirates 8.5 6.4 8.5 5.2 8.5 6.3
Ukraine 7.1 4.6
United States 9.0 8.4 9.0 8.3 9.1 9.0 9.0 8.7 9.1 8.3 9.0 9.3 9.1 8.4 9.0 8.8 9.0 8.7
Uzbekistan 6.1 3.5
Yemen 4.6 4.0 4.6 3.0 4.6 3.6
Zimbabwe 1.6 2.8
Pearson's correlation b/w  
HDI's and mean ratings
Number of countries rated
Notes: For each study, the HDI scores of the ratees correspond to the study year.  In study Lebanon 2008, the HDI for Lebanon is missing.  HDI 2009 is used. 
           Reported HDI scores are scaled by a factor of 10 to have the same range as the ratings of development (0-10).  
           In all studies, respondents were asked to rate development from 0-10, except Egypt 2011, Lebanon 2008, Lebanon 2011, and Saudi Arabia 2011, which asked 
           respondents to rate development from 1-10.  The rating scores from those four studies are rescaled to range from 0 to 10.  
Sources: Mean ratings are calculated based on Developmental Idealism study samples. 
             HDI ratings are retrieved from UNDP's online database (https://data.undp.org/dataset/Human-Development-Index-HDI-value/8ruz-shxu).
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CHAPTER 3 
The Making of Family Values:  
Developmental Idealism in Gansu, China
2 
3.1 Introduction 
Ideational explanations of international family change have become increasingly common in the 
literature.  For example, the worldwide family planning movements (Barrett and Frank 1999) 
and the efforts to improve women’s status (Berkovitch 1999; Boyle 2002; Yount 2004) have 
been due at least partially to the enactment of a “world culture”, which promoted concepts such 
as progress, individuality, human rights, freedom, and equality (Meyer et al. 1997).  In 
demography, cultural changes toward individualism and freedom in postwar Europe play a 
central role in the second demographic transition model offered by Lesthaeghe (2010) and van de 
Kaa (1987).  In addition, Johnson-Hanks et al. (2011) have attributed family changes and 
variation to various “schemas”—the mental structures that provide roadmaps for everyday 
behavior.  In this paper, we take a particular interest in how individuals’ family values are 
influenced by ideas concerning development.   
                                                          
2 Chapter 3 is co-authored with Arland Thornton. 
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Over the past two centuries, there has been a rise of family values endorsing such 
attributes as nuclear families, self-choice marriage, romantic love, equal spousal relationships, 
late marriage, and lower fertility (see, for example, Gubenskaya 2010; Inglehart 1997; 
Lesthaeghe and Meekers 1986; Thornton 1985, 1989; Thornton et al. 1983; Thornton and 
Philipov 2009; Thornton and Young-DeMarco 2001; Dorius and Alwin 2011; Esteve et al. 2012; 
Surkyn and Lesthaeghe 2004; van de Kaa 1987, 2002).  Parallel to the rise of these family values 
has been a worldwide dissemination of developmental thinking, which puts the idea of 
development at a central place in people’s minds (e.g., Ferguson 1999; Osella and Osella 2006; 
Pigg 1992).  Thornton (2001, 2005) argued that those two streams of ideational changes have 
been closely connected and have reinforced each other. 
According to Thornton (2001, 2005), family scholarship from the 18
th
 century has been 
dominated by a developmental worldview that has posited human societies going through stages 
of progress and that those stages of development are associated with different family behavior.  
This family scholarship associated the highest levels of development with nuclear families, self-
choice marriage, romantic love, equal spousal relationships, late marriage, and lower fertility, 
which it labeled as developed or modern family dimensions.  Thornton has labeled the ideas of 
this societal and familial model developmental idealism (DI). He has argued that these ideas 
about modern societies and modern families have been spread widely around the world, both 
among elites and non-elites, with implications for family behavior.  Within the ideas of 
developmental idealism Thornton has identified both beliefs and values as important components, 
with values also being seen as belief statements that contain evaluations of the goodness or 
badness of an attribute. Thornton summarized the ideas of developmental idealism into four 
fundamental beliefs and values: (1) developed society is good; (2) the modern family is good; (3) 
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development and the modern family are causally associated; and (4) individuals have the right to 
be free and equal, with social relationships being based on consent.   
Since its initial formulation, DI theory has informed empirical research in numerous 
countries.  The topics range from DI measurements (Thornton et al. 2010a; Thornton et al. 2012a) 
to the distribution of DI beliefs and values among different social groups (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 
2012; Binstock and Thornton 2007; Thornton et al. 2010b), and to their influences on family 
behaviors (Cammack and Heaton 2011; Guend 2011; Kavas and Thornton, 2013; Thornton and 
Philipov 2009; Yount and Rashad 2008).  However, previous literature has treated the DI beliefs 
and values as separate issues rather than considering their interrelationships.  This paper, for the 
first time, weaves the DI beliefs and values into a psychological mechanism producing the 
family values that DI language labels as modern (labels that we also use in our discussion of the 
framework
3
).  Patterning on the well-established expectancy-value model in psychology (e.g., 
Fishbein 1963, 1967; Fishbein and Ajzen 1975), we articulate a micro-level value formation 
process called DI associational evaluation—namely, that values about the positivity of 
development (DI idea 1) and belief in the associations between development and certain modern 
family behaviors (DI idea 3) jointly lead to positive values concerning those family behaviors 
(DI idea 2).   
Of course, the idea of development is not the only source of legitimacy.  Religious 
doctrines and organizational capacities are some of the most important alternative structures to 
DI as they provide their own long-standing schemas and authority.  Several empirical 
                                                          
3 We use the language of developmental idealism and modernity in our discussion in order to describe and analyze developmental 
idealism in its own terms.  However, we do not endorse certain societies or attributes themselves as modern or traditional.  See 
Thornton (2005) for a discussion of the language and labels used in describing developmental idealism as a belief and value 
system and the language and labels used in describing real societies and attributes.  
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investigations of DI have acknowledged the roles played by indigenous ideologies, yet so far no 
study has formally assessed DI’s influences net of strong local ideologies (Allendorf 2013; 
Guend 2011; Cammack and Heaton 2011; Kavas and Thornton, 2013; Thornton and Philipov 
2009; Yount and Rashad 2008; Yount et al. 2010).   
This study offers the first empirical investigation on the influence of DI associational 
evaluation on family values. Using survey data from Gansu Province in China, where a large 
Muslim population dwells, we assess the impact of DI associational evaluation on individuals’ 
endorsement of living arrangements, parental involvement in spouse choice, gender equality, 
fertility, and age at marriage. We also consider the local Islamic religion in juxtaposition with DI 
beliefs and values to examine the influence of Muslim religion and the net effect of DI 
associational evaluation.  Finally, we examine whether DI associational evaluation influences are 
modified by the local Islamic religion.   
 
3.2 Theoretical Formulations 
3.2.1 Developmental Paradigm  
The world, especially since WWII, has experienced the rise of a world culture (Barrett and Frank 
1999; Krücken and Drori 2009; Meyer et al. 1997; Thomas et al. 1987).  Ideas like individuality, 
rights, freedom, and equality have been disseminated around the world and gained great 
institutional authority (e.g., governments, non-governmental organizations, laws, and school 
curriculums).  One key element of this world culture is the idea of progress or development 
(Meyer et al. 1997).  Thornton (2001, 2005; also see, Melegh et al. 2012; van de Kaa 2010) has 
argued that at least since the Enlightenment a developmental paradigm has characterized the 
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worldviews of many scholars, policy makers, and other elites in the West.  The paradigm 
specifies an essentialized uni-linear trajectory of history, along which all countries progress at 
different rates (also see Harris 1968; Mandelbaum 1971; Nisbet 1969/1975; Sanderson 1990).  
Consequently, at any given moment different societies can be ranked into a developmental 
hierarchy.  For recent centuries northwest Europe and its overseas diaspora have generally been 
assigned to the top of the hierarchy, while other societies are viewed as less modern or developed 
and occupy lower positions on the scale.   
Such worldview, which boils qualitative differences between countries down to a single 
dimension of development or modernity, has been challenged by many social scientists in recent 
decades (e.g., Amin 1989; Baker 1998; Bock 1956; Böröcz 2000; Böröcz and Sarkar 2005; 
Chakrabarty 2000; Comaroff and Comaroff 1992; Hodgen 1964; Jennings 1975; Mandelbaum 
1971; Nisbet 1969; Szreter 1993; Tilly 1984; Wallerstein 1991).   Nevertheless, the existence of 
developmental hierarchies in people’s minds has been real and prevalent.  Since the Age of 
Discovery, the developmental paradigm was distributed by colonialists, revolutionaries, 
missionaries, academics, educators, rights advocates, business entrepreneurs, and media agents 
from its northwest European origin to numerous societies (Thornton 2005).  Throughout the 
world, the developmental doctrine has won extensive promotion by state governments and elite 
organizations (Boli and Thomas 1997; Chabbott 1999; Latham 2000; Meyer et al. 1997; Nisbet 
1969).  At the individual level, recent surveys in thirteen diverse populations show that 
developmental hierarchies are widely perceived by the ordinary respondents, and that the 
perceived hierarchies well conform to the version constructed by the United Nations (Thornton 
et al. 2012d; also see Binstock and Thornton 2007; Melegh et al. 2012).   
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The global triumph of the developmental paradigm and its product, perceived 
developmental hierarchies, have profound implications for social thinking at the individual level.  
Psychologically, the salient idea of development functions as a cognitive hub from which people 
infer knowledge about unknown things and derive value preferences (see Ajzen and Fishbein 
1980 and Fishbein and Ajzen 1975 for discussions on salient ideas).  In China, for example, 
when asked about economic inequality in other countries, which was not a familiar topic to most 
lay Chinese people, they were able to give answers based on what they believed about the level 
of development in those countries and what they believed about the relationship between 
development and inequality (Xie et al. 2012).   
 
3.2.2 DI Associational Evaluation 
With regard to family, an ideational system, termed developmental idealism (Thornton 2001, 
2005), has grown out of the conception of development.  Surveys conducted in Argentina, China, 
Egypt, Iran, Nepal, and the United States all ascertained that DI beliefs and values were widely 
accepted in those countries (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2012; Binstock and Thornton 2007; Thornton 
et al. 2012 a, b, and c).  While the strength of beliefs and values varies by countries and socio-
demographic groups, the levels of acceptance are generally high.     
In the initial formulation, the four DI beliefs and values were theorized as “independent 
and conceptually distinct” (Thornton 2005: 136), and this ideational system was proposed to 
provide an explanation for behavioral outcomes (Thornton 2001, 2005).  Indeed, the empirical 
literature on DI has always treated the beliefs and values as separate items with behavioral 
implications (e.g., Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2012; Cammack and Heaton 2011; Guend 2011; Kavas 
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and Thornton, 2013; Thornton and Philipov 2009; Thornton et al. 2012a, b, and c; Yount and 
Rashad 2008).  In this paper, we add to the DI literature by investigating family values as a result 
of the conjunction of another DI value and a DI belief.  Specifically, we propose that it is the 
conjunction of the endorsement of development and the perceived association between 
development and certain family behaviors that leads, at least in part, to the endorsement of those 
family behaviors. We label this value-formation mechanism as DI associational evaluation.  
As a micro-psychological process, our conceptualization of DI associational evaluation 
builds upon the expectancy-value model (e.g., Feather 1982; Fishbein 1963, 1967; Fishbein and 
Ajzen 1975).  The key usage of the expectancy-value model is to account for the formation of 
attitudes, defined as “dispositions to respond with some degree of favorableness or 
unfavorableness toward a given object” (Fishbein and Ajzen 2010: 96).  According to Fishbein 
and Ajzen (1975, 2010), (un)favorableness toward a given object flows directly from 
“preexisting evaluations of the attributes that become linked to an [the] object” (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 2010: 97).  In our context, this mechanism involves two DI ideas. On the one hand, the DI 
value that development is good (DI idea 1) serves as the preexisting evaluation.
4
   On the other 
hand, the DI belief that development and modern family are intrinsically associated (DI idea 3) 
provides a cognitive pathway for the positive value of development to be applied to concrete 
family behaviors.  Since Western Europe and North America currently occupy the apex of the 
development scale in most people’s minds, family behaviors typically observed in contemporary 
                                                          
4 Although development has been typically understood as eternal accumulation of material wellbeing (Thornton 2005: 137-138; 
also see, e.g., Condorcet 1796; Ekirch 1951; Godwin 1926/1793; Hegel 1878/1837; Marx and Engels 1965/1848; Nibset 1980) 
and associated with positive ethics and morality (Böröcz 2006; Chabbott 1999; Latham 2000; Taylor 2004; Thornton et al. 
2010b; United Nations 2005-2012), we acknowledge that important alternatives do exist.  For instance, it has been suggested that 
development is sometimes associated with excessive sex liberty, atheism, violence, etc. (Liechty 2003; Deeb 2006; Escobar 1988; 
Yount et al. 2010).   
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Western societies such as self-choice marriage, nuclear family, equal spousal relationship, late 
marriage, and low fertility are viewed as good and desirable.  Of course, the perceived 
associations between development and those family behaviors are not necessarily true in the real 
world, but as long as the beliefs are established, the positive aura over development is likely to 
facilitate the endorsement of family behaviors typically associated with Western societies.   
The expectancy-value model has a multiplicative functional form.  Fishbein and Ajzen 
(2010:97) have formally written the theory as , where in our context A stands for attitude 
toward or value concerning a modern family behavior (e.g., neolocal residence, fewer number of 
children), bi is the strength of the belief that that family outcome is linked to attribute i (i.e., 
development), and ei is the evaluation of attribute i.  With a summation operator, this formulation 
also accommodates additional attributes other than development that are believed to be 
intrinsically characteristic of modern family.  While acknowledging the broader truth of that 
panoramic view, in this study we maintain a focus on development as the sole attribute of 
interest.  Consistent with the multiplicative specification, we emphasize that the power of DI 
associational evaluation depends on the conjunctural direction and strength of the first and third 
ideas of DI.  For example, if one strongly favors development and at the same time associates it 
positively with, say, neolocal residence, one may easily conclude that it is good for married 
couples to set up new households away from their parents.  If either the first or third DI idea is 
absent or points in a different direction, the resulting attitude (or value) would be categorically 
different.  In the above example, one might still strongly prefer development, but a negative 
association of it to neolocal residence will drive a person’s attitude in the opposite direction.   
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3.2.3 Alternative Ideational Structures 
While focusing on developmental ideas, DI theory also recognizes the importance of co-existing 
alternative ideational models (Thornton 2005, 2010; also see, Inglehart and Baker 2000; Melegh 
2010).  As a world religion, Islam is known to have strong moral implications for both public 
and family life (e.g., Ali 2008; Calderini 2008; Huntington 1996; Inglehart 2007; Moaddel 2007; 
Rippin 2008; Stivens 2006).  Consistent with Islamic doctrine (e.g., Ali 2008; Calderini 2008), 
residents in Muslim-majority countries as well as Muslim immigrants in European societies, on 
average, hold less modern ideas on issues such as female labor force participation, 
intergenerational living arrangements, spousal relationships, and women’s reproductive 
autonomy (e.g., Ahmed 1992; Basit 1997; Bennett 2005; El-Islam 1983; Lesthaeghe 2000; 
Nirmila 2009; Pettersson 2007).  For example, a recent study on international fertility change 
found that while 79% of Chinese and 61% of Nepalese respondents agreed that having one child 
was better than having three, the endorsement levels in Egypt and Iran were merely 16% and 
36% (Thornton et al. 2012b: Table 4).   
Is DI associational evaluation, then, equally effective in leading Muslims to endorse 
modern family?  Previous empirical studies on DI have not offered a definitive answer to this 
question.  We do know that the developmental hierarchies perceived by respondents in Muslim-
majority countries are fairly similar to the hierarchies perceived by respondents in other 
countries (Thornton et al. 2012d).  Moreover, Muslim respondents are found to associate 
development strongly—sometimes even more strongly than respondents in non-Muslim 
societies—with late marriage, self-choice marriage, neolocal residence, low fertility, gender 
equality, and so on (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2012; Binstock and Thornton 2007; Thornton et al. 
2012a; Thornton et al. 2012b).  In other words, at least some of the pieces needed for DI 
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associational evaluation to work are in place among many Muslims.  However, whether those 
ideational components enable equally effective DI associational evaluation among Muslims and 
non-Muslims remains unclear.    
 
3.3 Research Site and Hypotheses  
3.3.1 Developmental Thinking and Family in China 
We chose China as the site of research because its policy environment has been highly pertinent 
to the mechanism of DI associational evaluation. Since the middle of the 20
th
 century, 
developmental discourse has been ubiquitous in China.  Prior to the Reform era beginning in the 
late 1970s, the official Marxian philosophy of history that dominated much of the national policy 
making was that China was progressing from a socialist to a communist society.  During the 
Reform era, the central tenet of developmental discourse has shifted from class relations to 
national economy, and as a corollary, the apex of the developmental hierarchy has shifted from 
the Soviet Union (or perhaps more often an imagined communist future) to the West.  In 1985, 
the then top Party leader, Deng Xiaoping, remarked that “peace and development are the two 
major issues of the contemporary world.”  Later, during his 1992 inspection trip to South China, 
Deng once again commented that “development is the hard truth.”  Both statements were 
enshrined as supreme guidance for the entire country.  After two decades of rapid economic 
growth, in the early 2000’s the government launched yet another national campaign to popularize 
the idea of “scientific development,” which stressed progress on multiple fronts rather than 
focusing on economic areas only (Song 2008).  Despite shifting substantive focus of 
 57 
 
developmental arguments, the teleological flavor and ultimate legitimacy of the concept of 
development in Chinese rhetoric have not changed in the last four decades.   
Regarding development’s association with modern family, the revisions of developmental 
rhetoric from class relations to socioeconomic issues are unlikely to have produced appreciable 
differences, because the communist family ideal happens to be well aligned with the predictions 
that are based on perceptions of western experiences (Engles 2010/1884; Goode 1963; Wolf 
1986).  It has been argued that the socialist transformation movement in the mid-1950’s 
effectively challenged long-standing patriarchal norms in urban China and led to later marriages 
by self-choices (rather than arranged by parents), more equal and romantic spousal relations, and 
a departure from the historical value of filial piety (Whyte 1990, 1995, 2003, 2004; Whyte and 
Parish 1984; Yang 1959).  These challenges were to a great extent justified by the discourse of  
socialist modernization (Diamant 2000).  During the post-Mao era, the family planning program 
continued to promote late marriage, late childbearing, and low fertility in the name of 
development, while tying the opposites to backwardness and poverty (Davis and Harrell 1993; 
Greenhalgh 2008).   
Given such policy background, it is safe to say that the two DI ideas required for DI 
associational evaluation—positivity of development and its association with modern family—are 
both part of the mainstream party thoughts in contemporary China.  Of course, the direction and 
strength of each idea necessarily vary across individuals, producing substantial heterogeneity in 
their conjunctural strength which enables us to empirically test the effect of DI associational 
evaluation on family values.   
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Hypothesis 1: A strong conjunction between endorsement of development and belief in its 
association with modern family (i.e., DI associational evaluation) leads to greater 
likelihood to endorse modern family. 
 
3.3.2 Islam in Gansu  
Beyond the net influence of DI association evaluation, we also ask if it penetrates through 
indigenous alternative ideational models.  Specifically, we assess if Islam changes the way it 
works.  This cannot be achieved by pooling data collected in Muslim and non-Muslim countries, 
since that comparison captures not only the differences made by Islamic religion but also other 
confounding factors that are difficult to account for, such as regional history, cultural tradition, 
and international politics.  Instead, we chose to conduct individual-level comparison between 
Muslims and non-Muslims in one homogenous area—Gansu Province in northwest China.   
In China, ten out of fifty-five Chinese ethnic minorities
5
 are predominantly Muslim, 
which are, in the order of population size, Hui, Uyghur, Kazak, Dongxiang, Kyrgyz, Salar, Tajik, 
Bonan, Uzbek, and Tatar.  The ten ethnic groups add up to 20.3 million Muslims, accounting for 
1.64% of the national population (China Statistical Bureau 2002: Table 2-1).  In 2005, Gansu 
was home to two large Muslim ethnic groups—Hui (4.1%) and Dongxiang (1.8%) (Gansu 
Statistical Bureau 2007: Table 2-1).  Unlike other Chinese Muslim ethnicities who are mostly of 
Turkic ancestries, Hui and Dongxiang people are practically indistinguishable from Han Chinese 
in physical appearance (though they both have non-Han components in biological ancestry) and 
                                                          
5 Though in Western societies the Chinese people are often considered as one single ethnic group, substantial internal 
heterogeneities exist in biological ancestry and ethnic culture.  In the 1950’s, the Chinese state identified fifty-six ethnic groups 
(officially termed “nationalities”), who collectively constituted the Chinese nation.  Among all Chinese ethnicities, Han consist of 
the overwhelming majority, accounting for 91.5% of the national population in 2000 (China Statistical Bureau 2002: Table 2-1). 
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are well assimilated into Han ethnic culture (e.g., Chang 2006; Ma 2004; Lipman 2004).  
Therefore, in Gansu the difference between non-Muslim Han people and Hui and Dongxiang 
Muslims is essentially religious adherence to Islam, a difference that is only marginally 
confounded by ethnic culture and biological ancestry.     
Although Islam is generally regarded as a “socially pervasive” religion (Gellner 1983), 
the ideational influences of Islam in today’s Gansu are more pertinent to private than public 
domains.  Muslim communities in Gansu suffered recurring state violence during the Manchu 
Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) (Li and Yu 1988; Lipman 1997; Zhang 2001).  During the turbulent 
early 20
th
 century, to make Gansu a safe place for Islam and its adherents, local Muslim leaders 
pledged allegiance to the central Republican government, which facilitated an integration 
between religious and the newly-forged Chinese national identities (i.e., Sino-Muslim) (Lipman 
1997).  Under the communist regime, Gansu Muslims were granted relative autonomy and 
freedom of religion until the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), when all religions were outlawed 
and persecuted across the country.  Since the late 1970’s, however, there has been an Islamic 
revival—in part an effort of restoration but also a reaction to various social “problems” that were 
believed to be caused by rapid economic growth (Armijo 2008).   
Due to such historical experiences and their minority status, the expressed discontent of 
today’s Gansu Muslims, if any, is not so much about the state’s political-legal basis as issues in 
the private sphere of life (e.g., Gladney 1996, 2003; Luo 2007).  With regard to family, our 
calculations based on 2005 census survey data show that Gansu Muslims are further away from 
the modern family model than Han people.  Specifically, they tend to marry earlier (by 
approximately 1.5 years), live in bigger families (with 0.7 more person per household), have 
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more children (0.3 more child per woman), and have wider spousal age gaps (also see Luo 2007).  
Taking these behavioral outcomes as revealed preferences, we propose our second hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: Muslims are less likely to endorse modern family values.  
While acknowledging Islam as an influential ideational structure that operates in the 
opposite direction as DI associational evaluation does, we have conceptualized the latter as a 
general  psychological process which therefore should be equally effective among Muslims and 
non-Muslims, hence our third hypothesis:       
Hypothesis 3: The influence of DI associational evaluation on the endorsement of 
modern family does not differ between Muslims and non-Muslims.   
 
3.4 Data and Methods 
3.4.1 2007 Gansu Survey 
Targeting all adult residents (aged 18+), the 2007 Gansu survey yielded a probability sample of 
632 respondents (analytic N = 621) with an overrepresentation of Muslims (i.e., Hui and 
Dongxiang) but was otherwise representative at the provincial level.  The survey adopted a 
multi-stage sampling scheme.  Among the fourteen prefectures of the province, six were 
randomly selected (i.e., Linxia Hui Autonomous Prefecture, Lanzhou, Baiyin, Tianshui, Dingxi, 
and Longnan).  Within each prefecture, three communities were chosen at random.  To identify 
enough Muslim respondents, six communities were selected in Linxia Hui Autonomous 
Prefecture.  Finally, for each community about thirty respondents were randomly determined and 
interviewed.  The survey was fielded by Gansu Provincial Academy of Social Sciences, which 
helped yield a high response rate of 94%.   
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As part of the international survey program on developmental idealism, the Gansu survey 
directly measured DI ideas.  The correlation between ethnicity and religion turned out to be 
perfect—none of the Han respondents believes in Islam while all Hui and Dongxiang 
respondents self-identify as Muslims.  The label “ethno-religion” is used to differentiate the two 
comparison groups—Han non-Muslims vs. Hui and Dongxiang Muslims.  As discussed above, 
this contrast mostly captures differences due to Islamic religion rather than those due to 
biological ancestry and ethnic culture.  The descriptive statistics are summarized in Tables 3.1 
and 3.2.   
 
3.4.2 Dependent Variables  
Our outcome variables, modern family values, were directly measured on five different 
substantive aspects.  During the survey, each respondent was asked:  
Overall, which do you think is better for most people around the world today—
married children living with their parents, or married children living separately?  
Similarly, respondents were asked which item in the following pairs is better: young people 
choosing their own spouses or parents choosing their spouses for them; a society in which there 
is equality between women and men or a society in which there is not equality between women 
and men; having one child or having three children; marrying at the age of 22 or marrying at 
the age of 28.  In what follows we refer to these five dimensions as neolocal residence, self-
choice marriage, gender equality, late marriage for women, and fewer children.  For each 
dimension, endorsement of the modern family is coded 1 and otherwise 0.  The summary 
statistics are reported in Table 3.2.  
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3.4.3  Key Independent Variables: DI Associational Evaluation Indices 
Our main explanatory factor is DI associational evaluation, for which we constructed five 
different indices, one each for our five family dimensions: neolocal residence, self-choice 
marriage, gender equality, late marriage for women, and fewer children.  We constructed these 
five separate indices so that for each family value dependent variable, there would be a 
corresponding DI Associational Evaluation Index.  Following our earlier discussion, we 
constructed each index as the product of perceived positivity of development and the 
development-family association, so that the power of DI associational evaluation would depend 
on the conjunctural strength of the two DI ideas.   
The positivity one attaches to development is retrieved using a binary response question 
asking if a moderately developed society [coded 1] or a society that is highly developed [coded 2] 
is better for most people around the world today.  The development-family association is 
measured, for each of the five dimensions, with a hypothetical question.  For example, the 
respondent’s perceived association between development and neolocal residence is based on the 
following survey item:  
[Now, please think about what life is like today in countries that are not 
developed and compare it to what life is like today in countries that are developed. 
Please tell us whether each of the following things, in general, is more common in 
countries that are not developed or more common in countries that are developed.] 
First, how about married children living with their parents—in general, is this 
more common in countries that are developed or more common in countries that 
are not developed?  
A. Not developed [coded 1] 
B. About the same[coded 0] 
C. Developed [coded -1] 
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Similar questions were also asked with regard to self-choice marriage, gender equality, late 
marriage for women, and number of children.    
Finally, for each of the five dimensions of family life, a DI Associational Evaluation 
Index was constructed as the product of the development positivity variable and the 
corresponding development-family association variable.  To facilitate interpretation, all DI 
Associational Evaluation Indices were then constrained between 0 and 1, with greater values 
representing stronger conjunctural strength between the two DI ideas. The distributions of the 
component items are reported in Table 3.1.  The resulting indices, as the key analytical variables 
used in statistical models, are summarized in Table 3.2.   
[Table 3.1] 
The multiplicative construction of the indices is sensitive to the coding of component 
variables.  As shown in Table 3.1, we have coded positivity of development as [1/2] rather than 
[0/1], and each association variable as [-1/0/1] rather than the more conventional [1/2/3].  As 
such, each index contains 5 levels [-2/-1/0/1/2] (later rescaled to [0/.25/.5/.75/1] for ease of 
interpretation).      
 
3.4.4  Other Independent Variables  
Our second main explanatory factor is Islamic religion.  Our Islamic religion variable is a 
straightforward indicator of Islamic religious affiliation versus non-Islamic religious affiliation.  
As mentioned before, the Islamic adherence is perfectly correlated with Hui and Dongxiang 
ethnicities but only minimally confounded with ethnic culture and biological ancestry.  
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In addition to the two ideational factors, we also used a number of other covariates in our 
analyses, including gender (male = 1), birth cohort dummies, marital status (currently married = 
1), urban/rural household registration (a.k.a. hukou, urban = 1), logged personal income in 2006, 
and years of education.  The cutoff points between birth cohort dummies correspond to what 
Whyte (2010) termed China’s two “social revolutions”—the socialist transformation prior to 
1956 and the economic reform since the late 1970’s.  Previous literature has identified these 
variables as effective explanations for family values (e.g., Inglehart and Pippa 2003; Logan and 
Bian 1999; Shu 2004).  In what follows we also refer to these control variables as structural 
factors to distinguish them from DI associational evaluation and Islamic religion.  The 
descriptive statistics of all analytic variables are summarized in Table 3.2.   
[Table 3.2] 
 
3.4.5 Statistical Models 
As is standard with binary outcomes, we estimated logistic regressions predicting respondents’ 
endorsements of neolocal residence, self-choice marriage, gender equality, late marriage for 
women, and fewer children, respectively.  The independent variables are the same across the 
models except for DI Associational Evaluation Indices, which vary across the dependent 
variables to match the outcome variable.  These models are labeled “dimension-specific models” 
in Tables 3.3 and 3.4.  For each dimension, four different sets of independent variables (Panels A 
to D) are specified to test different hypotheses.  
However, dimension-specific models have two disadvantages.  First, they do not utilize 
the information concerning the correlations among the five outcomes.  Second, they do not yield 
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interpretations regarding family life in general.  Therefore, a composite analysis is necessary to 
account for the within-individual clustering effect (i.e., the fact that each individual’s views on 
those five aspects are not independent of each other) and to draw conclusions about family life in 
general.  For the composite analysis, we used a multi-level approach that “collapsed” the five 
dimensions into one multilevel process, where the influences of various DI Associational 
Evaluation Indices on the corresponding family values were estimated simultaneously at the 
intrapersonal level (level-1) and the individual characteristics were considered personal-level 
(level-2) variables (see Xie et al. 2012 for a similar application of multilevel analysis).   
As shown in Table 3.3, the specifications of the multilevel logistic models across Panels 
A to D correspond to those of the dimension-specific models so that analogous interpretations 
can be achieved—but with reference to family life in general rather than particular familial 
dimensions.  Below we provide the specifications of the multilevel logistic models:   
(A) Level-1 model: 
ijjjijij xpp 21)]1/(log[    
Level-2 model: 
jj   111  
 
(B) Level-1 model: 
jijij pp 1)]1/(log[   
Level-2 model: 
jjj w   212111  
 
(C) Level-1 model: 
ijjjijij xpp 21)]1/(log[    
Level-2 models: 
jjj w   212111  
jj w222212    
 
(D) Level-1 model: 
ijjjijij xpp 21)]1/(log[    
Level-2 models: 
jjjjj www   919313212111 ...  
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 where i  denotes the i th family value ( 5,...,1i ), and j  denotes the j th individual 
( 621,...,1j ).  The log odds of endorsing modern family ( )]1/(log[ ijij pp  ) are regressed on 
the DI Associational Evaluation Index (
ijx ) irrespective of particular dimensions (except for 
Model B where 
ijx  is not included).  Level-2 variables jw2  through jw9  are Islamic affiliation 
(Islam = 1), gender (male = 1), birth cohort dummies for 1956-1976 and 1977-1989 (reference = 
1922-1955), marital status (currently married = 1), rural/urban hukou (urban = 1), logged 
personal income in 2006, and years of education, respectively.  Unlike linear multilevel models, 
there is no random error in the linear predictor of the log odds (Cf. level-1 models) because the 
residual variance of logit models is fixed at 3/2 . 
In addition to generality of the interpretation, another advantage of multilevel analysis 
was that we were able to include a random component ( j ) in the level-1 intercept and allow it to 
vary among the 621 individuals (level-2 units).   The random intercept could be realistically 
thought of as the unobserved heterogeneity at person ( j ) level that made individuals more or 
less inclined to modern family.   
 Given our cross-sectional setting, the influence of ideational factors on family values 
inevitably invokes concerns about endogeneity.  It is important to clarify that the goal of this 
study is to reveal the robust dependence of family values on ideational factors, not to rule out the 
possibility of reciprocal causation.  However, we maintain that the causal directions specified in 
our models are more plausible than their reverses.  Theoretically, our analytic scheme is 
supported by the well-established expectancy-value model in psychology.  Substantively, both 
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developmental thinking and Islam are systematically indoctrinated and long-standing belief 
systems rather than transient ideas that are easily contingent on shifting situations.  They are also 
elaborate ideologies that bear direct implications for our outcomes.   
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive Results 
Table 3.1 presents the descriptive results of the DI beliefs and values that are used in the 
construction of our key predictors, DI Associational Evaluation Indices.  A majority of 
respondents (77.6%) prefer highly developed societies and 66%-92.1% of the respondents 
positively associate development to the five modern family dimensions.  Comparing across 
ethno-religion, Han respondents are more likely to prefer development.  They are also more 
likely to associate development with modern family—except gender equality.   
The resulting conjunctural strengths of the DI beliefs, as captured by the DI Associational 
Evaluation Indices (Cf. Table 3.2) are high on average—all but the index for neolocal residence 
(0.65) score above 0.80 on a scale from 0 to 1.  On all five dimensions, DI associational 
evaluation is weaker among Muslims than Han people, with three differences statistically 
significant (i.e., self-choice marriage, late marriage for women, and fewer children).   
Table 3.2 also describes all other variables used in our models.  The level of endorsement 
of modern family varies substantially across dimensions.  Overall, most respondents endorse 
self-choice marriage (95%) and gender equality (99%), 78% endorse fewer children, and less 
than a half endorse neolocal residence (46%) and late marriage for women (49%).  Comparing 
across religious groups, Muslims’ endorsement levels are consistently and significantly lower 
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than Han people.  However, as shown by the structural covariates, Muslims also significantly 
differ from Hans in terms of age, rural/urban residence, and years of education.   To formally test 
our hypotheses, we now continue to the logit models.   
 
3.5.2 Hypotheses Testing  
[Table 3.3] 
The first ten columns in Table 3.3 report the results of dimension-specific logistic regressions 
predicting, respectively, the endorsement of neolocal residence, self-choice marriage, gender 
equality, late marriage for women, and fewer children.  These five dimensions were then 
estimated simultaneously with multilevel logit models summarized in the last two columns.  For 
each outcome, Panels A to C correspond to the reduced-form models for our Hypotheses 1 to 3, 
and Panel D presents the full models which include DI Associational Evaluation Indices, Islam, 
their interaction, and all the structural covariates.  Odds ratios are reported to facilitate 
interpretation.  While the Maximum Likelihood estimators (i.e., logit coefficients) are normally 
distributed, the odds ratios are not, which makes standard errors on the odds ratio metric not 
easily interpretable.  Therefore, instead of reporting standard errors of the odds ratios, for each 
odds ratio we calculated a Z-ratio as the absolute value of the logit coefficient divided by its 
standard errors (see Thornton, Axinn and Xie 2007 for similar applications).  
The bivariate models in Panel A partially support our first hypothesis.  All odd ratios are 
greater than 1, confirming that those who score high on the DI Associational Evaluation Indices 
are more likely to endorse modern family attributes.  For the first model, the odds ratio of 2.15 
means that those who score 1 on the index are 1.15 times more likely than those who score 0 to 
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endorse neolocal residence.  Similarly, the odds ratios for the self-choice marriage, gender 
equality, late marriage for women, and fewer children are 6.30, 9.83, 1.27, and 1.37, respectively.  
Although the effects are neither large nor statistically significant (at .05 level) for late marriage 
for women and fewer children, results of the five dimension-specific models generally confirm 
the positive role of DI associational evaluation in endorsing modern family items.  The 
composite multilevel model in Panel A shows that, irrespective of specific family dimensions, 
those who score 1 on the DI Associational Evaluation Index are 2.01 times more likely than 
those who score 0 to endorse modern family (odds ratio=3.01), and the effect is highly 
significant at .001 level.  We consider the multilevel model more conclusive because its 
estimation takes into consideration the person-specific unobserved heterogeneities (i.e., random 
intercept) that simultaneously drive individual’s views on all five family items. 
Models in Panel B examine the influences of Islamic religion on family values.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, Muslims are 0.42, 0.13, 0.15, 0.33, and 0.62 times as likely as Han 
people to endorse neolocal residence, self-choice marriage, gender equality, late marriage for 
women, and fewer children.  Except for fewer children, all odds ratios are significantly different 
from 1.  After collapsing the five dimensions using one multilevel model, results show that 
Muslims are half as likely as Hans to endorse modern family (odds ration=0.50), which is 
statistically significant at .001 level.  
Moving on to the third hypothesis, in Panel C models we included both ideational factors 
and their interactions to examine if DI Associational Evaluation Indices influence Muslims’ 
family values in the same way as they influence Han people.  The coefficients on interaction 
terms are inconsistent in both magnitude and direction across dimensions.  Importantly, none of 
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the interactions is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, which is also true with the 
corresponding multilevel model.  We consider these results supportive of our third hypothesis—
that DI associational evaluation is a universally applicable cognitive process that operates among 
Muslims and non-Muslims alike.  We also notice that, putting DI associational evaluation and 
Islamic belief in juxtaposition to each other (together with their interactions) has created 
substantial competition between these two ideational forces—the influence of DI Associational 
Evaluation Indices on gender equality loses statistical significance and so does Islam’s influences 
on neolocal residence and self-choice marriage.  
In Panel D, we further included a set of structural covariates (i.e., gender, birth cohorts, 
marital status, rural/urban hukou, logged income, and years of education) to account for the 
observed sources of variation in the outcomes that are due to non-ideational forces.
6
  As it turned 
out, the net effects of DI Associational Evaluation Indices, Islamic belief, and their interactions 
remained very similar to previous models.  In dimension-specific models, on the one hand, the 
main effects of the indices are all positive and significant for neolocal residence and self-choice 
marriage; on the other hand, Islamic belief reduces one’s likelihood to endorse all five modern 
family attributes, and the influences are statistically significant for gender equality and late 
marriage for women.  In addition, as indicated by the consistent lack of statistical significance 
for the interaction terms, the influences of DI associational evaluation are not significantly 
different between Muslims and non-Muslims. Again, the composite multilevel model yields 
more conclusive and supportive results for all three hypotheses.  The DI Associational 
                                                          
6 Urban hukou predicts endorsement of gender equality perfectly. As a result, inclusion of the hukou variable would lead the logit 
model to drop all the urban cases. Therefore, for gender equality, we excluded the information concerning rural/urban hukou 
from the full model.  The model is otherwise identical across the five family dimensions.  
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Evaluation Index raises one’s likelihood of endorsing modern family by 171%, whereas Muslims 
are half (0.46 times) as likely as Han people to endorse modern family.  Both effects are 
statistically significant but not their interaction, which means that the influence of DI 
associational evaluation is not qualified by religious adherence to Islam.   
[Table 3.4] 
So far we have based our test of the third hypothesis on the interaction terms in logit 
models (here reported on odds ratio metric).  However, in nonlinear models the interaction effect 
does not equal the marginal effect of the interaction term (Ai & Norton 2003), which makes 
direct interpretation of the estimated coefficients difficult.  Therefore, we also calculated the 
predicted probabilities (based on average marginal effects) for Muslims and Han people at 
different levels of DI Associational Evaluation Indices to reveal their interactive patterns in more 
tangible ways.  Based on the full models where covariates are held at the mean level, we observe 
the probabilities of endorsing modern family in Table 3.4.  The last row shows the probability 
changes over the full span of DI Associational Evaluation Indices (from 0 to 1), which we use as 
more intuitive indications of the effects of DI association evaluation.  Comparing the two 
religious groups across the five dimensions, we find that the differences between Muslims and 
Han people vary in both magnitude and direction. While DI association evaluation has a stronger 
impact on Han respondents than Muslims in terms of neolocal residence (12% vs. 11%), self-
choice marriage (10.6% vs. 2.2%), and fewer children (6.6% vs. -1.7%), the impacts are weaker 
among Han than Muslims in terms of gender equality (0.8% vs. 33.4%) and later marriage for 
women (0.2% vs. 23.3%).  Taking all five dimensions together, the random-intercept multilevel 
model predicts that DI Associational evaluation increases Muslims’ probability to endorse 
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modern family by 24.4% and Han’s probability by 20.6%, which we consider a difference of 
limited importance.  In conclusion, we recognize that in our sample, DI associational evaluation 
coefficients for Muslims and Han people are different in inconsistent ways, but we have no 
evidence to conclude that those differences are not due to random error.    
 
3.5.3 Notes on other Findings 
As shown in Panel A of Table 3.3, for late marriage for women and fewer children, the effects 
due to DI Associational Evaluation Indices are statistically insignificant even without controls.  
However, we refrain from concluding that DI associational evaluation does not influence those 
two dimensions.  Regarding late marriage for women, the survey questions used for the 
dependent and independent variables are not entirely compatible—while the former uses age 
eighteen as the threshold to differentiate early and late marriages, the question for the association 
between development and late marriage for women (which is used in the index construction) 
uses the age contrast between twenty-eight versus twenty-two.  Had the two questions employed 
the same criterion, the estimated result could have been more pronounced and significant.  
 The case with fewer children is less curious if we take China’s birth control program into 
consideration.  Given extensive exhortation for nearly three decades, a strong sense of political 
correctness might have permeated evenly through different levels of DI associational evaluation 
and tinted people’s responses.  In that case, answers would reflect political correctness, rather 
than true opinions about low fertility.  Of course, if the responses were truthful, we must 
conclude that variations in preferences for low fertility are indeed not attributable to variations in 
DI associational evaluation. 
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In addition, it is useful to note the differences between the influences of ideational factors 
and those due to the structural factors.  Across dimensions, the effects of DI Associational 
Evaluation Indices and Islam are consistently positive and negative, respectively.  However, the 
coefficients on gender, birth cohorts, marital status, hukou, and income all vary considerably 
across dimensions, pointing to different directions and mostly statistically insignificant.  The 
most consistent structural effect comes from education, which pushes people in the direction of 
modernity except in the case of late marriage for women.  In this sense, ideational explanations 
account for the variations in people’s family values in more systematic ways than structural 
factors do.   
 
3.6 Discussion 
Our paper provides an individual-level ideational explanation for the endorsement of modern 
family attributes.  Specifically, we have shown how the conjunction of people’s value for 
development and their perceived associations between development and certain family attributes 
can jointly lead to endorsement of those family attributes.  We integrated developmental idealism 
in sociology and demography and the expectancy-value model in social psychology to articulate 
the cognitive process of DI associational evaluation.  Our empirical results provide supports for 
the influences of DI associational evaluation.  We also find that such influences are robust in the 
presence of an alternative ideational model, in this case Islam.  
With this paper we make three first-time contributions to the theory of developmental 
idealism.  First, drawing on the expectancy-value framework, we weave together multiple DI 
ideas, which were initially defined as distinct and independent, into an interactional mechanism 
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that generates modern family values.  Second, developmental idealism had been used to explain 
behavioral trends, but in this paper, we extend DI’s relevance to value outcomes.  Third, this 
paper empirically assesses the impact of alternative ideational models, in this case Islam, and its 
competition with DI in affecting family value orientations.   
This paper also has implications for general family scholarship.  First, given the 
continuing expansion of developmental ideas around the world, the global rise of modern family 
values, in the aggregate form, could be to a great extent attributable to this micro-level 
psychological phenomenon.  Second, our results indicate that developmental ideas and Islamic 
belief are more consistent than structural factors in explaining the variation in multiple views on 
the family, which signals the importance of ideational explanations for international family 
change.  In this paper we have focused on developmental thinking, while other ideas such as 
science, human rights, and legality are also worth investigating.    
We advise against two overgeneralizations of our findings.  First, our empirical 
investigation is confined to five specific familial dimensions, which are neither the entirety nor a 
random sample of all aspects of family life.  Although those five dimensions do provide a 
reasonable coverage of the most important intergenerational, gender, marriage, and fertility 
issues, it would be unwise to ignore the qualitative differences between concrete family 
dimensions and claim equal truth of DI associational evaluation for all domains of family life.   
Our second reservation has to do with the external validity concerning the Islamic 
influences.  While the relative homogeneity of Gansu helps us identify cleaner effects due to 
Islamic religion, such effects cannot be generalized beyond Gansu.  Today, a total of 1.6 billion 
Muslims live in more than two hundred countries (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2009).  
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Gansu Muslims cannot possibly fully represent such enormous heterogeneity.  Even within 
China, our results might have been different if we had conducted the study with, for example, 
Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang Autonomous Region.  In this paper we have treated Islam as a 
special case of indigenous alternative ideational models that compete with developmental 
thinking.  For an overall view of how Islamic beliefs work in the making of family values, 
empirical efforts have to go beyond the scope of the current study.   
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Table 3.1. Distribution and coding of items used in DI Associational Evaluation Indices, by ethno-religion
Total Muslim Han
Positivity of development 
% preferring moderately developed society (coded 1) 22.4 26.8 21.7
% preferring highly developed society (coded 2) 77.6 73.2 78.3
Development-family association
Neolocal residence 
% negative association (coded -1) 31.6 37.8 30.6
% no association (coded 0) 2.4 1.2 2.6
% positive association (coded 1) 66.0 61.0 66.8
Self-choice marriage
% negative association (coded -1) 6.0 17.1 4.3
% no association (coded 0) 1.9 1.2 2.0
% positive association (coded 1) 92.1 81.7 93.7
Gender equality
% negative association (coded -1) 9.0 9.8 8.9
% no association (coded 0) 3.5 2.4 3.7
% positive association (coded 1) 87.4 87.8 87.4
Late marriage for women 
% negative association (coded -1) 15.8 26.8 14.1
% no association (coded 0) 0.5 0.0 0.6
% positive association (coded 1) 83.7 73.2 85.3
Fewer children
% negative association (coded -1) 9.0 14.6 8.2
% no association (coded 0) 1.6 1.2 1.7
% positive association (coded 1) 89.4 84.1 90.2
Sample size 621 82 539
Source:  2007 Gansu Survey.  
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Table 3.2. Distribution
†
 of analytic variables, by ethno-religion
Total Muslim
Modern family values (% endorsement)
Neolocal residence 45.7 28.0 48.4 -20.4 **
Self-choice marriage 95.2 81.7 97.2 -15.5 ***
Gender equality 98.7 95.1 99.3 -4.1 **
Late marriage for women 49.1 26.8 52.5 -25.7 ***
Fewer children 78.4 70.7 79.6 -8.9
DI Associational Evaluation Index (0-1)
Neolocal residence 0.65 0.60 0.66 -0.06
(0.42) (0.44) (0.42) (0.05)
Self-choice marriage 0.88 0.78 0.90 -0.12 ***
(0.24) (0.35) (0.22) (0.03)
Gender equality 0.85 0.84 0.85 -0.01
(0.28) (0.29) (0.28) (0.03)
Late marriage for women 0.80 0.70 0.81 -0.11 **
(0.34) (0.40) (0.33) (0.04)
Fewer children 0.86 0.80 0.86 -0.07 *
(0.28) (0.33) (0.27) (0.03)
Male (%) 44.9 50.0 44.2 5.8
Age 43.2 40.1 43.7 -3.6 *
(13.8) (14.5) (13.6) (1.6)
Birth cohort (%)
1922-1955 30.6 28.0 31.0
1956-1976 53.9 43.9 55.5
1977-1989 15.5 28.0 13.5
Currently married (%) 87.8 90.2 87.4 2.9
Urban (%) 19.3 31.7 17.4 14.3 **
Personal income in 2006 (yuan ) 3,117      3,235      3,099      136
(3,744)    (4,246)    (3,665)    (444)  
Years of education 7.3 6.2 7.4 -1.3 **
(3.4) (3.7) (3.4) (0.4)
Sample size 
Notes: 
†
 Standard deviations are presented in parentheses under means.  Percentage  
             distributions are presented in italics.
         
 †† 
The last column shows t-test results for differences between Muslim and Han 
             respondents.
           * p  < .05, ** p  < .01,  *** p  < .001. 
Source:  2007 Gansu Survey.
Han Δ(Muslim-Han)
††
82 539621
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Table 3.3. Logit and multilevel logit models predicting modern family values
Z
†††† Z Z Z Z Z
Panel A: Bivariate: DI Associational Evaluation Index
DI Associational Evaluation Index (0-1) 2.15 *** 3.90 6.30 *** 3.56 9.83 ** 2.77 1.27 1.02 1.37 0.94 3.01 *** 9.68
Model/Wald χ
2
 (df )
Panel B: Bivariate: Islam 
Islam (Ref. = non-Islamic affiliation) 0.42 ** 3.37 0.13 *** 5.31 0.15 ** 2.68 0.33 *** 4.18 0.62 1.80 0.50 *** 6.28
Model/Wald χ
2
 (df )
Panel C: DI Associational Evaluation Index × Islam
DI Associational Evaluation Index (0-1) 2.06 ** 3.45 10.72 ** 3.42 2.53 0.67 0.97 0.12 1.37 0.83 2.79 *** 8.10
Islam (Ref. = non-Islamic affiliation) 0.37 1.96 0.70 0.40 0.03 ** 2.60 0.12 ** 3.02 0.75 0.40 0.45 ** 3.19
DI Associational Evaluation Index × Islam 1.26 0.35 0.13 1.96 19.67 1.52 3.76 1.65 0.80 0.27 1.26 0.75
Model/Wald χ
2
 (df )
Panel D: Full model 
DI Associational Evaluation Index (0-1) 1.62 * 2.21 9.51 ** 3.14 2.72 0.71 1.01 0.03 1.47 1.01 2.71 *** 7.84
Islam (Ref. = non-Islamic affiliation) 0.37 1.85 0.94 0.07 0.02 * 2.39 0.11 ** 3.16 0.91 0.13 0.46 ** 3.06
DI Associational Evaluation Index × Islam 1.10 0.15 0.13 1.82 31.04 1.63 4.35 1.79 0.63 0.56 1.22 0.66
Male (Ref. = female) 0.92 0.45 1.29 0.54 0.69 0.45 1.20 1.02 1.11 0.49 1.08 0.83
Birth cohort (Ref. = 1922-1955)
1956-1976 1.38 1.56 0.23 * 2.42 0.14 1.53 1.40 1.66 1.79 * 2.50 1.21 1.94
1977-1989 1.10 0.31 0.21 * 2.06 0.31 0.75 0.92 0.29 2.24 * 2.25 1.06 0.43
Currently married (Ref. = unmarried) 0.84 0.61 0.96 0.06 1.43 0.29 0.60 1.83 1.19 0.54 0.85 1.13
Urban hukou  (Ref. = rural) 2.33 *** 3.48 0.89 0.19 - - 1.44 1.58 0.86 0.57 1.32 * 2.34
Logged personal income in 2006 1.12 1.42 0.95 0.25 1.22 0.59 0.87 1.85 1.00 0.01 0.99 0.30
Years of education 1.08 * 2.50 1.26 ** 2.67 1.12 0.81 0.99 0.24 1.03 0.79 1.03 * 2.02
Model/Wald χ
2
 (df )
Sample Size 
Notes:  
†
   In dimension-specific models, for each outcome a thematically consistent DI Associational Evaluation Index is used.   
            
††
  The multilevel models are random-intercept models for binary outcomes that estimate the five family values simultaneously. 
            
†††
 For gender equality, urban hukou predicts endorsement perfectly and problemizes the estimation of logit model. It is therefore excluded from the full model. 
            
††††
 Z is the ratio of absolute value of the logit coefficient (log odds ratio) to its standard error.  
           * p  < .05, ** p  < .01,  *** p  < .001. 
Source:  2007 Gansu Survey.
27.06(3)*** 34.37(3)*** 15.57(3)**
621 621 621 621621
68.25(10)*** 51.43(10)*** 20.25(9)** 16.45(10)35.6(10)***
0.85(1)
3,105
141.69(10)***
25.27(1)*** 6.36(1)* 3.10(1) 39.48(1)***
3.79(3) 121.70(3)***22.89(3)***
12.36(1)***
Dimension-specific models
†
Multilevel models
†† Neolocal 
residence
Self-choice 
marriage 
Gender equality
 ††† Fewer children
93.75(1)***
Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio Odds ratio
15.61(1)*** 10.31(1)** 6.51(1)*
Late marriage     
for women
Odds ratio
1.05(1)
19.46(1)***
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Table 3.4. Predicted probablities (×100) of endorsing modern family across levels of DI Associational Evaluation Indices
Muslim Han Muslim Han Muslim Han Muslim Han Muslim Han Muslim Han
DI Associational Evaluation Index 
0.00 20.4 40.7 87.3 88.0 66.0 98.7 10.4 52.5 72.5 74.4 39.7 58.9
0.25 22.9 43.6 87.9 92.8 85.5 99.0 14.4 52.5 72.1 76.1 45.8 64.8
0.50 25.5 46.6 88.5 95.8 94.7 99.2 19.6 52.6 71.7 77.9 52.0 70.3
0.75 28.4 49.6 89.0 97.5 98.2 99.4 26.0 52.6 71.2 79.5 58.1 75.2
1.00 31.5 52.6 89.5 98.6 99.4 99.5 33.7 52.7 70.8 81.0 64.0 79.5
Change across index range 11.0 12.0 2.2 10.6 33.4 0.8 23.3 0.2 -1.7 6.6 24.4 20.6
Note: Probabilities are predicted based on the full models in Table 3, where all covariates are held at the mean level. 
Source:  2007 Gansu Survey.
Multilevel modelLate marriage 
for women 
Gender equality
Self-choice 
marriage
Neolocal 
residence 
Fewer children
Dimension-specific models 
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CHAPTER 4 
Chinese Adulthood Higher Education: 
Life Course Dynamics under State Socialism 
4.1 Introduction 
Modern life course has become increasingly diversified (e.g., Berger et al. 1993; Macmillan 
2005; Ravanera et al. 2004).  Although certain norms exist at the societal level, life course events 
of different individuals do not uniformly follow any fixed sequence (Hogan 1978; Rindfuss et al. 
1987).  Traditionally, transition to college occurs immediately upon the completion of secondary 
education, but such transition has never been universally successful.  Nowadays, for those who 
missed their first opportunities, it is a common choice to continue with higher education at a later 
time in adulthood in the presence of alternative life course engagements. As a result, college-
related decisions and experiences often occur after and depend on those about marriage, 
parenthood and work (Adelmen 2006; Alexander et al. 2008; Bozick 2007; Bozick and DeLuca 
2005; Bradburn et al. 1995; Deli-Amen and Turley 2007; Goldrick-Rab 2006; Goldrick-Rab and 
Han 2011; Kerckhoff 2004; Pallas 2004).  This paper, for the first time, examines such adulthood 
life course dynamics in Chinese people’s pursuit of higher education (at undergraduate level) 
under the regime of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).   
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The pursuit of adulthood higher education (AHE) rose in the context of world educational 
expansion (e.g., Baker and Letendre 2005; Craig 1981; Meyer et al. 1977, 1992), which began to 
gain momentum at the tertiary level in the 1960s (Schofer and Meyer 2005).  Today, higher 
education in many countries is characterized by diversified institutional systems and inclusive 
enrollment patterns (Arum et al. 2007; and see Choy 2002 for an U.S. example).  In 2010, those 
aged 25 or above accounted for more than 30% of tertiary-level enrollments in at least twenty-
five OECD countries (OECD 2012).  Though confounded by the scale of graduate education, this 
is powerful evidence that undergraduate education at older ages has become a significant part of 
world’s higher education.  
China’s higher education system consists of two parallel sectors—a regular sector that 
typically recruits graduating senior middle school students through entrance examinations, and 
an adult sector that typically provides part-time programs for out-of-school adult learners.  It is 
important to clarify that both sectors had contributed to AHE.  In 2011, China’s undergraduate 
enrollment climbed to over 33 million (State Education Commission 2011).  It is not clear how 
many of those students were AHE attendees (i.e., beyond “normal” college-attending ages), but 
31% of them were enrolled in the adult sector (i.e., correspondence programs, night-time 
colleges, broadcasting and TV universities, internet-based programs).  With such a large student 
body, the adult sector played a significant role in credential production, accounting for 35% of 
the 9.3 million undergraduate diplomas conferred in 2011.  Historically, due to limited capacity 
of the regular sector, adult programs were even more important—between 1949 and 2011, 
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approximately 41% of all Chinese undergraduate credentials were achieved through adult 
programs (State Education Commission 1984-2012; see Appendix Table 4.1).
7
   
Yet the adult sector is not the only destination for AHE-seekers in China. As I will show 
later, in 1949-1965 the regular sector used to be at least an equally important AHE provider.  
During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1977), normal college recruitment was essentially 
suspended on a national basis.  As one of the post-hoc compensatory measures, the age limit for 
admissions to regular undergraduate programs was officially set to 30 in 1977 and 1978, and 
then 28 between 1979 and 1981 (Yang 1995: Table 2-13).  After that, the age limit had remained 
25 until it was eventually abolished in 2001.  Age-specific enrollment numbers in regular sector 
are not available, but there is little doubt that a non-trivial proportion of Chinese adult learners 
went to college in the regular full-time sector.   
Despite high prevalence of AHE in China, the influences of adulthood characteristics on 
college enrollment has attracted little scholarly attention.  Indeed, until the rise of research on 
sequential variability of adulthood life course events, the assumption of education’s precedence 
to work and family had dominated social science literature (e.g., Blau and Duncan 1967; Duncan 
et al. 1972; Featherman and Hauser 1978; Grusky and DiPrete 1990; Jencks et al. 1979; Sewell 
and Hauser 1980; Sewell et al. 1969, 1970; Shavit and Müller 1998; Shavit et al. 2007).  To this 
day, sociological research on Chinese educational stratification is still largely confined to the 
tradition of status attainment literature, where one’s own work and family (for procreation) 
characteristics are assumed to be post-outcome and excluded from the analysis (e.g., Wu and 
Zhang 2010; Hannum and Xie 1994; Yeung 2013; Zhou et al. 1998).  While doing so is 
                                                          
7 Undergraduate credentials include diplomas awarded by both two/three-year junior colleges and four-year degree programs.  
Credentials obtained through self-study examinations are excluded.   
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essentially legitimate for primary and secondary educational outcomes, such assumption simply 
does not agree with the reality of Chinese higher education.   
In this paper I fill the gap by asking how Chinese people’s pursuit of higher education 
over adulthood has depended on his or her engagements in other life course activities (i.e., 
marriage, parenthood, work).  I then examine the modern institution of Chinese AHE and 
separate out the work-based state sponsorship from the generic effect of work on AHE 
enrollment.  Such state sponsorship is further considered in historical context to reveal its 
dynamics over time.  Based on life course literature and PRC institutional background, I propose 
three logics in a progressive order—alternative life course engagement, work-based state 
sponsorship, and enhanced state sponsorship.  Using retrospective data collected in 2003 Chinese 
General Social Survey (CGSS 2003), I trace individual life history back to 1949 and test the 
three hypotheses with discrete-time event-history analyses.   
 
4.2 First-order Logic: Alternative Life Course Engagement 
Conditional on failure in the initial direct transition to college, how have AHE opportunities 
depended on alternative adulthood life course activities?  At the first order, there is the 
fundamental inter-domain competition for one’s time and resources.  In modern times, family, 
education, and work have become separate life course domains (Hareven 1982).  In adulthood, 
one could possibly assume a variety of roles—college student, paid employee, spouse, parent, 
and so on.  However, constrained by time and resources, there is a limit to how much one can do 
at the same time.  Multitasking of course is possible (and often unavoidable), but engagement in 
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one domain necessarily reduces one’s availability and/or affordability for others—the difference 
is but a matter of degree.   
Higher education, in particular, requires heavy investment of both time and financial 
resources.  Despite the prospect of delayed gratification, not everyone could afford such 
investment or the opportunity cost it would invoke.  Also, unlike some work and family 
responsibilities, college coursework cannot be outsourced or shared by household members—at 
least not in principle.  Therefore, although various part-time mechanisms make switches across 
domains possible, concurrent engagements in college and other life course activities remain 
highly challenging for most people.  Because of this, participation in higher education is found to 
be responsible, at least in part, for delayed entrance into employment, independent living, 
cohabitation, marriage, childbearing, and so on (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991; Marini 1984; 
Marini, Chan, and Raymond 1987; Rindfuss, Swicegood, and Rosenfeld 1987; Thornton, Axinn, 
and Teachman 1995).  Reversely, however, the story is more complicated.  While marriage and 
parenthood are found to delay college enrollment (Bozick and DeLuca 2005; Goldrick-Rab and 
Han 2011), part-time employment increases the likelihood of mothers’ reentry into schools 
(Bradburn et al. 1995).  This is not surprising considering the productive nature of employment.  
While jobs cost time and energy that can be otherwise spent on attending college, they also 
generate financial resources to pay for it, which is all the more important given the expectation 
of adulthood independence.  Hence our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Marriage and parenthood, as alternative adulthood life course 
engagements, are likely to suppress higher education opportunities over one’s adulthood.  
    
94 
 
The negative effect of labor force engagement, however, might be diluted or even 
overwhelmed by positive influences due to its earning nature.   
 
4.3 Second-order Logic: Work-Based State Sponsorship  
Of course, individual life course dynamics can never be isolated from the macro-institutional 
environment (Leisering 2004).  Under strong state socialism, Chinese people’s life experience 
had been greatly influenced by highly interventionist policies (Parish and Michelson 1996; 
Szelényi and Kostello 1996; Walder 1996), including those pertaining to education (e.g., 
Hannum and Xie 1994; Deng and Treiman 1997; Pepper 1996; Treiman 2013; Zhou, Moen, and 
Tuma 1998).  Drawing on official statistics (see Figure 4.1 and Appendix Table 4.1) and 
historical documentations, in what follows I construct a rather extensive review of the modern 
institution of Chinese AHE, from which I extract a theme of work-based state sponsorship.  
[Figure 4.1] 
In a sense, adulthood higher learning is not new in China.  For centuries, it had existed as 
part of traditional Chinese meritocratic bureaucracy (e.g., Chang 1955; Ch’ü 1961, 1972; Elman 
2000; Weber 1951).  The civil service examination system, as an effective means of social 
mobility (e.g., Ho 1959, 1962; Hsu 1949; Kracke 1947), has fostered a strong appreciation of 
learning regardless of age (Elman 2000; Rozman 1981:189-190; Wang 1960, 1961).  Such 
legitimacy of adulthood academic credentials was capitalized on during China’s communist 
revolution.  Since the 1920s, many higher learning institutions were established in the areas 
controlled by the communists.  Unlike higher education under the Nationalist regime, communist 
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colleges aimed not to prepare participants for civil labor market, but to credential revolutionary 
cadres for the Party’s struggles for power (Dong, Dan, and Chen 2007:250; State Education 
Commission 1984:582).  As a result, those communist colleges were characterized by Party-
sponsored recruitment and weak organizational formality (Dong, Dan, and Chen 2007:184-250).  
Such war-time pragmatism, as I will show below, has never left the modern institution of 
Chinese AHE.  
By 1952, the communist adult colleges were mostly dismantled (He 2004:38), but they 
quickly gained a new life on the newly nationalized college campuses.  In 1950, the Ministry of 
Education ordered that cadres with worker or peasant backgrounds enjoy lower academic 
standards in college admissions (State Education Commission 1984:585).  In 1955 and 1956 
alone, some 51,000 cadres were admitted to regular college programs in the name of “opening 
door to workers and peasants” (State Education Commission 1984:585), accounting for 18% of 
the total regular college recruitment in those two years.  For about ten years after 1949, the ratios 
between regular college recruitment and senior middle school graduation were extremely high 
and often exceeded 1, suggesting large amount of alternative progressions to regular 
undergraduate programs.   
Apart from taking grounds in the regular sector, a separate adult part-time sector was 
soon created.  Patterned on the USSR model, the new adult sector mainly consisted of 
correspondence programs and night-time colleges.  As shown in Figure 4.1, the proportion of 
adult sector enrollment grew quickly from 0.1% in 1949 to 14.7% in 1957 (Cf. Appendix Table 
4.1).  Unlike communist colleges in the past, the new adult sector focused on the needs of state-
building (i.e., teacher-training, finance and accounting, engineering) rather than those of 
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revolutionary struggles (He 2004:51). The normal order of state-building efforts, however, was 
soon disrupted.   
Excited at the establishment of public ownership and some initial economic growth, the 
Party launched the Great Leap Forward movement in 1958.  For three years to come, the whole 
nation was seized by an ideological zeal.  To achieve the ambition of “popularizing higher 
education in fifteen years,” the formerly centralized college accreditation and student recruitment 
were left in the loose hands of local authorities (He 2004:94).  In no time, hundreds of “worker’s 
colleges” and “peasant’s colleges” were established at local urban work units and agricultural 
collective communes.  As a result, the adult sector enrollment increased by ten times within three 
years—from 76,000 in 1957 to 793,000 in 1960.  Not surprisingly, they suffered rapid 
deterioration along with the national economy and eventually became unsustainable.  Between 
1960 and 1961, the enrollment in adult programs dropped by nearly a half to 410,000.  Since 
1961, the situation had remained relatively stable—until there arrived another wave of political 
turmoil.   
Between 1966 and 1977, the Cultural Revolution pushed socialist radicalism to its 
extreme.  The higher education was diagnosed by Mao as usurped by the capitalist intelligentsia.  
To “regain” the universities, educational activities were discontinued and replaced by on-campus 
class struggles (e.g., Deng and Treiman 1997; Pepper 1996).  For a total of eleven years, the 
exam-based higher education recruitment was suspended.  At the same time, some 17 million 
urban middle school graduates were forcibly “sent down” to live and work in the countryside 
(see Bernstein 1977; Zhou and Hou 1999).   
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However, in the later phase of Cultural Revolution, Chinese AHE experienced a surge in 
both regular and adult sectors.  Beginning in 1972, regular colleges recruited rather extensively 
from adult workers, peasants, and soldiers with at least two years of work experience based on 
recommendation by local work units and political screening (hence the label 
“worker/peasant/soldier college students”);8 in the meanwhile, a huge growth occurred in the 
adult part-time sector, which peaked in 1976 at an enrollment of 2,628,600, accounting for 82% 
of the total undergraduate enrollment (Cf. Appendix Table 4.1).  But those numbers cannot be 
taken at face value.  On the one hand, most worker/peasant/soldier college students were 
admitted with no more than some education at the level of junior middle school, whose campus 
life was yet preoccupied by class struggle activities (State Education Commission 1984:83).  On 
the other hand, the skyrocketing adult part-time enrollment was the result of a short-lived fervor 
of radical educational egalitarianism.  Like what happened during the Great Leap, the dramatic 
expansion of the adult sector was driven not by the well managed correspondence programs, 
night-time colleges, or broadcasting and television universities, but by substandard institutions at 
the grassroots level.  For instance, over 56% of the 1976 adult part-time enrollment came from 
the so-called “7-21 Universities” (Dong, Bi, and Zhang 2002:117).9   
In the wake of Cultural Revolution, China’s higher education quickly recovered in 
response to policy adjustment and market demand for human capital.  The cohorts who were kept 
out of colleges, especially those “send-down” youth who counted on college recruitment to 
                                                          
8
 The worker/peasant/soldier student recruitment already began in 1970 and 1971, but only with a limited quota of 42,000 per 
year.   
9
 Like the “half-work, half-study universities” in the Great Leap Forward movement, the “7-21 Universities” were established by 
local authorities in an egalitarian fervor with Mao’s bless. Unlike regular universities, the “7-21 Universities” were essentially 
on-job training programs for urban workers.  In rural areas, similar part-time institutions were mostly named “5-7 Universities” 
or “Communist Labor Universities.”  
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regain urban life, created a nationwide outcry for higher learning opportunities.  In the October 
of 1977, the first college entrance examination since 1965 received over 20 million applications 
(Yang 1995:45)—by contrast, senior middle schools only graduated a total of 5.9 million 
students in the same year (State Education Commission 1984).
10
  To accommodate massive 
demand for AHE, measures were taken in both regular and adult sectors.  The age limit for 
regular full-time college admissions was set to 30 and then 28 in 1977-1981, and 25 thereafter.  
At the same time, the formal adult part-time system, including correspondence programs, night-
time colleges, and broadcasting and television universities, was fully reinstated and expanded.
11
  
Conditional on decent quality, some “7-21 Universities” were preserved and transformed into 
workers’ colleges, and continued to serve adult workers in urban China.  Several case studies on 
the workers’ colleges in the 1980s found that they functioned relatively well and were generally 
well received in society (Deaux 1988; Yu and Xu 1988).  It is worth noting that the recruitment 
of the adult sector, unlike regular colleges, has been based on a mixture of academic merit and 
institutional sponsorship.  To maintain national standards, the adult sector began to administer 
centralized entrance examinations in 1986.  Yet as a state policy, favored admissions based on 
political capital never went extinct (State Education Commission1994:330-331).   
Having clarified the institutional background, the role of work-based state sponsorship in 
the stratification of AHE opportunities becomes rather obvious.  Previously, we have argued that 
                                                          
10
 The 1977 entrance examinations were administered at the provincial level.  The centralized state-run college entrance 
examination was officially restored in 1978.  Though the 1977 exams still involved political screening and not standardized 
across the nation, it was the first-time nationwide college recruitment based on academic merit since 1965.  After political 
screening, 5.7 million out of the 20 million applicants were allowed to sit the exams, among whom 0.27 million eventually 
gained admissions (i.e., an admission rate of 4.7%).   
11
 The correspondence programs were partially restored in 1972 on a recommendation basis, and served mainly the send-down 
youth during the Cultural Revolution.  The scale was small, though.  By 1974, a total of 73 institutions in 17 provinces and 
autonomous municipalities enrolled only 0.1 million students (Dong, Bi, and Zhang 2002:119).   
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while marital life and childrearing generally reduce one’s time and resources for education, the 
effects of work goes beyond the simple logic of inter-domain competition.  Besides the 
aforementioned apparent tradeoff between time-use and earnings, work in urban China has 
distinct institutional attributes that also powerfully influence the stratification of AHE 
opportunities.  In urban China, work units (a.k.a. danwei) have been important and persistent 
agents of the distribution of life resources and opportunities (Wang 2008; Wu 2002, 2013; Xie, 
Lai, and Wu 2009; Xie and Wu 2008).  The reward structure in urban work regime partially 
depends on the proximity to state power, which varies significantly across and within work units.  
Across different types of work units, Party/government agencies and state-owned professional 
services (e.g., education, research, health care, media, finance) stand the closest to state authority.  
Within work units, higher administrative rank (i.e., higher cadre status) and political elite status 
(i.e., Party membership) lead to greater access to the distributive power (Li and Walder 2001).  
Hence our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Conditional on working, one’s likelihood of AHE enrollment is positively 
associated with workplace-based state sponsorship, including affiliations with state-
owned professional services or Party/government agencies, cadre leadership (i.e., keji 
level or above), and Party membership.   
 
4.4 Third-order Logic: Enhanced State Sponsorship 
However, PRC’s institutional environment has not remained static.  After three decades of 
recurrent social turmoil, a profound change took place around 1978 when the national economy 
began to shift gradually from central planning to a market-oriented basis, which Whyte (2010:25) 
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called a “second social revolution.”  Accordingly, Chinese AHE had suffered thirty years of 
institutional instabilities before the “second social revolution” launched a sustained expansion 
beginning in 1978—a pattern as reviewed in the previous section.  Now the question is—has the 
state sponsorship in AHE recruitment become stronger or weaker during the post-1978 reform 
period?   
The reform period observed over three decades of sustained growth of Chinese higher 
education, whose enrollment rose steadily from 1.1 million in 1978 to over 3 million in late 
1990s.  In 1999, China launched an unprecedented higher education expansion.  Within eight 
years, undergraduate enrollment nearly quadrupled.  The increase was mainly driven by a 
dramatic expansion of the regular sector, whose enrollment rose from 3.4 million in 1998 to 23.1 
million in 2011, resulting in a decline in the share of the adult sector in higher education 
enrollment (Cf. Figure 4.1).  Nevertheless, in term of absolute numbers the adult sector 
experienced much faster growth after the expansion.  Between 1978 and 1998, the adult sector 
enrollment grew at an annual rate of 3.5% (from 1.4 million to 2.8 million); whereas since 1998 
the number increased steadily at a rate of 10.5% to 10.4 million in 2011.  In other words, though 
demand for AHE may shrink in the long run given increasing rates of direct secondary-to-tertiary 
progression, to this day it has shown no signs of waning.   
With the introduction of market, the significance of state authority in the distribution of 
life resources and opportunities has declined—but only in relative terms.  Despite the “evident 
vulnerability of Party reward structures to the kinds of market-oriented reforms” (Walder 
1995:326), the absolute amount of material returns to political capital turned out to be persistent 
and increasing in the reform period (Bian and Logan 1996; Bian, Shu, and Logan 2001; Hauser 
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and Xie 2005; Zhou 2000).  Walder (2003) suggested that an important reason was the 
appreciation of market values of the public assets under the control of the political elite.  In other 
words, rather than suppressing the political elite’s distributive power, the reform has generated 
more rewards at their disposal.   
The distribution of educational opportunities follows the same logic.  Raftery and Hout 
(1993) have argued that in the context of educational expansion, the preexisting forms of 
inequalities were to be “maximally maintained.”  It is true that the post-1978 education 
expansion provided more AHE opportunities on the basis of individual merit.  But at the same 
time, given political stability in China’s post-socialist transition, the educational expansion also 
put more AHE opportunities at the disposal of the state.  Therefore, those who stood closer to the 
institutional power were even more likely, than ever before, to take free rides during the reform 
period.  This rationale further introduces a temporal change to the institutional effects specified 
in H2, and yields our third and final hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 3: The state sponsorship in AHE recruitment (as in H2) was likely to enhance 
during the post-1978 reform period.   
 
4.5 Data, Variables and Methods 
4.5.1 Data  
To test the three logics in the stratification of AHE opportunities over the PRC period, I perform 
event-history analysis using data from the 2003 Chinese General Social Survey.  The survey 
adopted a multi-stage sampling scheme with probabilities of selection proportional to size, 
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yielding a sample of 5,894 adult urban residents (aged 18-69) in 2003.  CGSS 2003 is the first 
national sample, albeit confined to urban areas, that ever provides rich retrospective information 
on multiple domains of Chinese people’s life course.  Also, it was conducted early enough to 
capture at least some AHE information around the earliest period of the People’s Republic—the 
oldest respondents of CGSS 2003 were born in 1934 and just came of age around 1949.  The 
unique combination of these two advantages makes CGSS 2003 ideal for our research question 
(Bian and Li 2012).   
 
4.5.2 Event-history Data Setup and Outcome Measure 
Based on retrospective information on respondents’ first transitions to higher education, I 
distinguished 4,325 respondents who never went to colleges by 2003, 518 who experienced AHE 
enrollments, and 519 who experienced direct transitions to colleges upon completion of 
secondary education (Cf. Table 4.1).  AHE enrollments were defined as transitions to junior 
colleges (i.e., non-degree programs) or colleges (i.e., degree programs) that 1) occurred between 
ages 18 and 45, and 2) had an at least 1-year interruption in educational history immediately 
prior to the transition.  As AHE enrollment is conditional on failure in direct secondary-to-
tertiary progression, our analysis involves the first two groups only, while the third column is 
included to supplement auxiliary information.  The table entries will be interpreted later in the 
results section.   
[Table 4.1] 
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To prepare for event-history analysis, I transformed the person-level data to person-year 
format.  As previously defined, the event of interest is the first-time transition to AHE.  If one 
failed to directly advance to higher education, she was considered at risk of AHE enrollment.  
For all eligible persons, the risk starts at age 18 and ends at event occurrence, age 45, or at a 
younger age in 2003 (i.e., the censor point).  Thus defined, only the respondents in the first two 
columns in Table 4.1 contribute to the risk set.  To focus on the PRC period, person-years earlier 
than 1949 were excluded.  Finally, I obtained 101,883 person-years in total, including 101,365 at 
risk and 518 event occurrences.
12
  The huge amount of exposure leads to a small mean annual 
probability (0.0051), but the 518 events rule out the methodological concerns about rare event 
analysis.   
 
4.5.3 Key Independent Variables  
My analysis used three discrete-time logit models corresponding to the three orders of 
hypotheses.  To test H1, I coded three time-varying status dummies for engagements in marriage, 
parenthood, and paid employment.  For H2, conditional on being employed, I added three time-
varying indicators for the three types of work-based state sponsorship, including the affiliation to 
                                                          
12 Ideally, the data set should be a random sample of all eligible person-years ever lived in China from1949 to 2003.  
But it is not, nor is it a cohort panel starting from 1949 onward.  Rather, what it is representative of is the lived 
experience of the surviving population in 2003 urban China.  Like all retrospective longitudinal data, this invokes a 
problem of mortality selection.  Namely, those who attended colleges in early years might have enjoyed better life 
chances and longevity; their contemporaries who never went to college, on the other hand, are less likely to survive 
to 2003, whose contribution to the exposure in earlier years is therefore missing.  Due to the over-representation of 
events (relative to exposure), the estimated risk rates in early periods would be artificially higher.  Unfortunately, 
information for weighting on AHE-specific mortality is not available.  Based on our sample, the mean annual 
probability of event is 0.0018 in 1949-1977 and 0.0062 in 1978-2003, which seems to be within reason after all.   
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state-owned professional services or Party/government agencies, cadre leadership (i.e., keji or 
above), and Party membership.  Finally, for H3, I further introduced interaction terms between 
the state sponsorship variable and a dummy variable indicating the historical period of 1978-
2003.   
As our data concerning the institutional advantages are relatively limited, especially 
among those who never went to college (Cf. Table 4.1), for H2 and H3 I also provided an 
alternative specification of the state sponsorship.  Instead of treating the advantages separately, I 
constructed a time-varying additive index that represented the number of advantages one 
possessed in a given year. The index score ranges from 0 to 3.  For example, if one was at the 
same time employed in a government agency and a Party member, his/her score for the 
institutional advantage index would be 2 for that year.   
 
4.5.4 Control Variables  
To minimize model specification biases, control variables were carefully selected.  First, two 
temporal dimensions—historical periods and personal ages—were included to saturate period 
and aging effects.  The period dummy marks all years since 1978 as 1 and all previous years 0.  
Personal age was entered as quadratic function.  Second, as reviewed above, those whose 
transitions to colleges were suppressed during the Cultural Revolution exhibited a strong 
resilience after the restoration of higher education (Deng and Treiman 1997).  To partial out this 
cohort anomaly, I created an interaction term between the school cohorts affected by Cultural 
Revolution (i.e., born in 1948-1956) and the post-1978 indicator.  Third, factors in traditional 
educational stratification research were also considered, including gender, ethnicity, time-
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varying hukou status, prior educational merit (i.e., senior middle school completion), and family 
background (i.e., parents’ years of education when respondents were 18).   
While regional variation is a major source of social heterogeneity in China (Wang 2008; 
Wu and Zhang 2010; Xie and Hannum 1996; Zhou, Moen, and Tuma 1998), our data only 
provide residential locations in 2003, which are outcome-dependent and cannot be used in the 
models.  Nonetheless, I conducted trials with 2003 provincial dummies, and the results presented 
in Table 4.2 remained essentially the same.   
 
4.6 Results  
4.6.1 Person-level Descriptive Results  
Table 4.1 describes the person-level sample by three types of educational profiles.  For each 
group, I computed the features of the transitions (if applicable), respondents’ permanent 
characteristics, and respondent’s contemporaneous characteristics at transitions (if applicable) 
and in 2003.   
Regarding the nature of AHE transitions, a number of findings emerge from all three 
columns in Table 4.1.  First, they were equally significant as regular direct transitions, 
accounting for half of all transitions to colleges (518 vs. 519).  Second, 91% of all progressions 
to AHE occurred during the post-1978 reform period, which is well aligned with the official 
statistics (Cf. Appendix Table 4.1).  Nonetheless, this percentage does contain an upward bias 
because those who experienced AHE transitions prior to 1978 are older and less likely to survive 
to 2003.  Third, strong determination lay behind the pursuit of AHE—as indicated by a pre-
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enrollment gap of 9 years on average.  Indeed, a total of 264 (51%) AHE transitions occurred 
beyond age 25 (not presented in Table 4.1), leading to a rather high average age at AHE 
transitions of 27.  Fourth, both adult and regular sectors had provided for adult learners, 
accounting for 72% and 28% of all transitions to AHE, respectively.  Fifth, most (89%) AHE 
transitions led to enrollments at junior colleges (i.e., non-degree programs), while only 50% of 
direct transitions landed on non-degree programs.  Sixth, near three quarters of AHE attendees 
(73%) got enrolled in arts majors, whereas only half (52%) of direct transitions ended up in arts 
majors.  Finally, among those with non-zero income in 2002, urban Chinese who attended AHE 
(N=486) on average earned 15,513 yuan, which was 3,500 yuan lower than those who 
experienced direct transitions (N=511)  but 7,563 yuan higher than those who never made their 
way into colleges (N=3,828).  Those income numbers need standardizations, but the observed 
pattern suggests rather high returns to AHE, making it an effective compensatory choice.   
Conditional on failed direct transitions (i.e., the third column excluded), who were more 
likely to attend AHE?  In terms of permanent characteristics, men and those with more educated 
parents had an advantage.  In terms of life course dynamics, which is our key research question, 
Table 4.1 contains some hints at work-related state sponsorship.  If we assume adulthood 
constancy of 2003 work-related characteristics for those who never went to colleges and 
compare them to respondents’ characteristics at AHE transitions in the second column, it is clear 
that AHE attendees—at the time of transition—were more likely than the former group to be 
employed in Party/government agencies (15% vs. 2%), state-owned professional services (9% vs. 
6%), and to be cadre leaders (8% vs. 1%) and Party members (21% vs. 14%).  However, the 
dependence of AHE opportunities on life course activities cannot be adequately revealed without 
unfolding the retrospective information fully to person-year observations, to which we now turn.    
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4.6.2 Tests of Hypotheses 
Table 4.2 summarizes the results of five discrete-time logit models.  Given our event-history data 
setup, all five models estimate the hazard rates (or more precisely, annual probabilities) of 
getting enrolled in AHE.  Models 1-3 are presented in progressive order and correspond to 
Hypotheses 1-3, respectively.  For the second and third hypotheses which involve the 
institutional sponsorship, two alternative specifications are provided.  Specifically, the models 
with three distinct advantage variables are named Models 2a and 3a, and the models with the 
composite advantage index are named Models 2b and 3b.    
[Table 4.2] 
In a nutshell, all our hypotheses are largely supported.  First, Model 1 shows negative 
effects of marriage and parenthood but a positive effect of employment.  Specifically, marriage 
decreases one’s odds of AHE transition by 34%, and parenthood decreases the odds by 32%, 
both significant at the 0.01 level.  On the other hand, having a job raises the odds by 28%, which 
is marginally significantly at the 0.1 level.   
Second, in Model 2a the effect and statistical significance of the coefficient on 
employment status disappear upon the inclusion of the work-related state sponsorship.  
Conditional on working, the affiliation with state-owned professional services or 
Party/government agencies, Party membership, and cadre leadership increase the odds of AHE 
enrollment by174%, 202%, and 172%, respectively, which are all highly significant at 0.001 
level.  In the meanwhile, marriage and parenthood remain statistically significant deterrence 
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factors, reducing the odds by 42% and 24%, respectively.  In Model 2b, where all three types of 
institutional advantages are collapsed into one single additive index, each one unit increase in the 
index is estimated to raise the odds of AEH enrollment by 184%, while all other effects remain 
essentially the same as Model 2a.   
Finally, to test for the historical change of the institutional sponsorship, in Model 3a the 
three institutional advantage variables are allowed to interact with a period dummy for post-1978 
years.  As indicated by the interaction effects, the influences on advantageous danwei affiliations 
and Party membership both become more than twice as strong as the pre-1978 years, which are 
significant at 0.1 level.  However, the positive effect of cadre leadership does not become more 
pronounced during the reform period.  Again, for parsimony I summarize the three institutional 
factors with one composite index in Model 3b, which yields an odds ratio of 1.51 with statistical 
significance at the 0.1 level.  In both Models 3a and 3b, the influences due to marriage and 
parenthood remain negative and statistically significant.   
Regardless of the specifications of the institutional advantages, the incremental inclusions 
of further nuances across Models 1-3 significantly improve the models’ goodness of fit.  
Specifically, the work-based state sponsorship variable(s) causes a greater improvement (210.14 
over a df of 3, or 209.78 over a df of 1) than the post-1978 change(s) (7.78 over a df of 3, or 3.84 
over a df of 1).    
The control variables all exert expected influences on AHE opportunities, which are very 
similar across the models.  First, along temporal dimensions, one’s likelihood of AHE enrollment 
increases during the post-1978 reform period, while the age effect follows a quadratic function, 
with the AHE enrollment most likely to occur at ages 27-28.  Second, the post-Cultural 
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Revolution resilience (i.e., higher likelihood of AHE transition) proves to be statistically 
significant among the affected school cohorts in Models 1, 2a and 2b.  Third, in terms of the 
conventional stratifying mechanisms, AHE opportunities are positively associated with maleness, 
urban hukou, senior middle school completion, and father and mother’s years of education when 
respondents were 18.  Ethnic minorities are found to be more likely to attend AHE than Han 
Chinese, but the advantage is not statistically significant.   
 
4.7 Conclusions and Discussion 
Though underrepresented in the literature, Chinese people’s continuing pursuit of higher 
education in adulthood—in both the adult and regular sectors—has been so prevalent that it 
might have accounted for half of the undergraduate credential output in PRC history.  As 
transitions to higher education at older ages are likely to happen in the presence of alternative 
adulthood life course activities, the progression to AHE is qualitatively different from direct 
transitions to undergraduate programs immediately upon the completion of secondary education.  
Therefore, in addition to pre-adulthood characteristics such as academic merit and family 
background, one’s adult life also matters in the stratification of AHE opportunities.  However, 
without allowing for sequential variability of adulthood events, previous literature has never 
investigated the adulthood life course dynamics in Chinese people’s pursuit of higher education.   
This paper took up the issue by constructing and examining Chinese people’s annualized 
life histories across ages 18-45.  Our analysis found that, across the PRC period, marriage and 
parenthood decreased one’s likelihood to get enrolled in AHE, whereas having a job increased 
the likelihood.  The contributing effect of employment was attributable to state sponsorship in 
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PRC’s urban work regime.  Specifically, those whose employments were closer to state power 
(i.e., in Party/government agencies and state-owned professional services) or those who enjoyed 
advantageous statuses at the work place (i.e., cadre leaders and Party members) were much more 
likely to advance to AHE during adulthood.  Furthermore, such institutional advantages became 
even more pronounced since 1978.   
In conclusion, this paper makes three distinct contributions to the research on Chinese 
higher education.  First, it relaxed the assumption of higher education’s precedence to other 
adulthood engagements.  By focusing on AHE as a qualitatively distinct outcome, our paper for 
the first time investigated Chinese people’s life course dynamics in the stratification of higher 
education opportunities over adulthood.  Second, going beyond simple logics of life course 
engagement, I systematically examined the modern institution of Chinese AHE and revealed the 
increasingly important role of state sponsorship embedded in individuals’ engagement in work.  
Third, this paper made an extension to the argument of maximally maintained inequality (MMI) 
in the literature on educational stratification (Raftery and Hout 1993).  Namely, in the context of 
post-1978 AHE expansion, certain pre-existing stratifying mechanisms (i.e., work-based state 
sponsorship) were found to be stronger than in the pre-reform period (1949-1977).  While MMI 
originally referred to persistent class inequalities, our paper extended the theme to the 
inequalities due to state power.  
In Models 2b and 3b, I collapsed three distinct institutional characteristics (i.e., 
employment in Party/government agencies or state-owned professional services, cadre leadership, 
and Party membership) into one generic category of work-based state sponsorship for 
parsimonious interpretation.  While doing so can be justified by their common conceptual 
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meaning—closeness to institutional power, we need to be cautious about the variable’s internal 
heterogeneity.  For example, the advantage associated with the employment in state-owned 
professional services might also be attributable to the credentialist pressures in those professional 
occupations (e.g., positions in education, research, medical services, media, finances, etc.).  After 
the market reform, such pressures were likely to have amplified due to the rise of individual 
meritocracy in the ripening labor market.  Given substantial and increasing returns to college 
diplomas (Naughton 1996; Xie and Hannum 1996; Zhang et.al 2005)—including those earned in 
the middle of one’s career (Xiao 2002; Liu and Xiao 2006), employees in state-owned 
professional services might have become more active in pursuing AHE during the post-1978 
period.   
Though this study focused on the stratifying mechanisms of AHE opportunities, it also 
brings forward the importance of other aspects of Chinese AHE.  For example, our descriptive 
results in Table 4.1 suggest substantial returns to AHE in terms of income and career mobility, 
which are likely to be important reasons behind the highly active participation in AHE.  Also, 
while our final event-history analyses made no differentiation between various types of 
transitions to AHE, our person-level examination of the transitional characteristics (Cf. Table 4.1) 
has revealed substantial diversity in terms of destination and field of study.  When data permits, 
further nuances in these regards provide great promise for future empirical investigations.   
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Table 4.1. Sample descriptives by states of the first transition to higher educaion, person-level
No transition 
by 2003 AHE transition
Direct 
transition
(N  = 4,325) (N  = 518) (N  = 519)
Contributors to risk set Yes Yes No
Characteristics of the first transistion to higher education
Year of transition (%)
1949-1977 - 9.3 19.5
1978-2003 - 90.7 80.5
Number of years elapsed since last year in school - 8.7 0.0
- (6.6) (0.0)
Type of destination (%)
Adult sector junior college (non-degree program) - 67.8 12.7
Adult sector college (degree program) - 4.1 2.3
Regular sector junior college (non-degree program) - 21.2 37.4
Regular sector college (degree program) - 7.0 47.6
Enrollment in arts majors (%) - 73.4 51.7
Respondents' permanent Characteristics
Male (%) 46.0 59.7 54.5
Han (%) 94.6 93.6 95.8
Father's years of education at age 18 5.2 8.0 9.4
(4.4) (4.6) (4.5)
Mother's years of education at age 18 3.2 5.6 7.7
(4.1) (4.8) (4.9)
Respondents' characteristics at first transistion to higher education
Age - 27.4 18.9
- (6.5) (1.4)
Urban hukou  (%) - 97.1 98.3
Married (%) - 51.5 -
Parent (%) - 31.3 -
Employed (%) - 87.1 -
Party/government agencies (%) - 15.1 -
State-owned professional services (%) - 9.1 -
Cadre status (% keji  or above) - 8.1 -
Party member (%) - 21.2 -
Respondents' characteristics in 2003
Age 44.1 41.8 34.8
(12.6) (10.4) (14.8)
Urban hukou  (%) 91.1 99.2 99.2
Married (%) 87.0 89.2 59.7
Parent (%) 62.3 64.7 33.7
Employed (%) 42.8 79.0 60.3
Party/government agencies (%) 2.1 13.1 9.6
State-owned professional services (%) 6.1 28.5 29.9
Cadre status (% keji  or above) 1.1 15.1 7.4
Party member (%) 13.7 46.5 26.2
Annual personal income in 2002 (RMB) 7,950 15,513 19,013
(10,853) (12,188) (17,280)
Source: CGSS 2003.  
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Table 4.2. Discrete-time logit models predicting non-direct progression to higher education over adulthood (ages 18-45)
s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e. s.e.
Adult life course dynamics (time-varying)
Marital status (1=currently married) 0.66 ** 0.09 0.58 *** 0.08 0.58 *** 0.08 0.59 *** 0.08 0.58 *** 0.08
Parenthood (1=yes) 0.68 ** 0.08 0.76 * 0.09 0.75 * 0.09 0.76 * 0.09 0.75 * 0.09
Employment status (1=employed) 1.28 † 0.18 0.99 0.14 1.00 0.15 0.98 0.14 0.99 0.14
Advantage 1: Party/government agencies or 
state-owned professional services 2.74 *** 0.31 1.44 0.55
× Reform period dummy (1978-2003) 2.02 † 0.80
Advantage 2: Party membership 3.02 *** 0.37 1.43 0.61
× Reform period dummy (1978-2003) 2.28 † 1.01
Advantage 3: Cadre status (1=keji or above) 2.72 *** 0.49 4.58 ** 2.14
× Reform period dummie (1978-2003) 0.55 0.28
Institutional advantage index 2.84 *** 0.18 1.95 ** 0.42
× Reform period dummie (1978-2003) 1.51 † 0.33
Control variables 
Reform period dummie (1978-2003) 2.42 *** 0.39 3.06 *** 0.50 2.36 *** 0.45 3.07 *** 0.50 2.46 *** 0.47
Age 1.32 *** 0.09 1.35 *** 0.09 1.36 *** 0.09 1.35 *** 0.09 1.36 *** 0.09
Age
2
1.00 *** 0.00 0.99 *** 0.00 0.99 *** 0.00 0.99 *** 0.00 0.99 *** 0.00
Resilience after Cultural Revolution 1.37 * 0.17 1.23 † 0.15 1.21 0.15 1.23 † 0.15 1.22 0.15
Gender (1=male) 1.59 *** 0.15 1.42 *** 0.13 1.40 *** 0.13 1.43 *** 0.13 1.43 *** 0.13
Ethnicity (1=Han) 0.83 0.15 0.83 0.15 0.83 0.15 0.83 0.15 0.83 0.15
Time-varying hukou  status (1=urban) 1.79 * 0.48 1.70 * 0.45 1.73 * 0.46 1.70 * 0.45 1.73 * 0.46
Senior middle school completion (1=completed) 2.80 *** 0.26 2.36 *** 0.22 2.36 *** 0.22 2.36 *** 0.22 2.36 *** 0.22
Father's years of education at age 18 1.09 *** 0.01 1.08 *** 0.01 1.08 *** 0.01 1.08 *** 0.01 1.08 *** 0.01
Mother's years of education at age 18 1.06 *** 0.01 1.06 *** 0.01 1.06 *** 0.01 1.06 *** 0.01 1.06 *** 0.01
Constant 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00 0.00 *** 0.00
Model χ
2
 (df )
LR χ
2
 (df ) 
Notes: † p  < 0.1, * p  < 0.05,  ** p  < 0.01, *** p  < 0.001.  
Source: CGSS 2003 (person-level N  = 4,843; person-year N  = 101,883).
830.94(16)
        210.14(3)***
Model 3a
620.80(13)
NA
Odds ratioOdds ratio
Model 1
Odds ratio
830.57(14)
        209.78(1)***
838.72(19)
 7.78(3)†
834.41(15)
 3.84(1)†
Model 3b
Distinct advantages Composite advantage index
Model 2b
Odds ratio
Model 2a
Odds ratio
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Appendix Table 4.1. Chinese higher education student statistics, undergraduate level, 1949-2011 (in thousands)
Adult Regular Adult Regular Adult Regular Adult Regular Adult Regular Adult Regular
1949 0          117      - 31        - 21        1981 1,346   1,279   - 279      315      140      
1950 0          137      - 58        - 18        1982 1,173   1,154   - 315      426      457      
1951 2          153      - 52        - 19        1983 1,129   1,207   342      391      234      335      
1952 4          191      - 79        - 32        1984 1,293   1,396   482      475      164      287      
1953 10        212      - 82        2          48        1985 1,725   1,703   473      619      347      316      
1954 13        253      - 92        2          47        1986 1,856   1,880   788      572      450      393      
1955 16        288      - 98        3          54        1987 1,858   1,959   563      617      481      532      
1956 64        403      - 185      1          63        1988 1,728   2,066   498      670      754      553      
1957 76        441      - 106      3          56        1989 1,741   2,082   698      597      499      576      
1958 150      660      - 266      5          72        1990 1,666   2,063   578      609      489      614      
1959 300      812      - 274      4          70        1991 1,645   2,044   492      620      620      614      
1960 793      962      - 323      8          136      1992 1,479   2,184   518      754      518      604      
1961 410      947      - 169      18        151      1993 1,994   2,536   592      924      465      571      
1962 404      830      - 107      36        177      1994 2,504   2,799   942      900      607      637      
1963 418      750      - 133      33        199      1995 2,570   2,906   1,094   926      636      805      
1964 445      685      - 147      43        204      1996 2,842   3,021   914      966      841      839      
1965 413      674      - 164      42        186      1997 2,724   3,174   1,025   1,000   892      829      
1966 - 534      - - - 141      1998 2,822   3,409   1,004   1,084   826      830      
1967 - 409      - - - 125      1999 3,103   4,086   1,001   1,549   888      848      
1968 - 259      - - - 150      2000 3,536   5,561   1,206   2,206   880      950      
1969 - 109      - - - 150      2001 4,560   7,191   1,561   2,683   931      1,036   
1970 - 48        - 42        - 103      2002 5,592   9,034   1,959   3,205   1,175   1,337   
1971 - 83        - 42        - 6          2003 6,092   11,086 2,447   3,822   1,605   1,877   
1972 17        194      - 134      4          17        2004 6,564   13,335 3,051   4,473   2,290   2,391   
1973 146      314      - 150      6          30        2005 7,013   15,618 2,821   5,045   2,428   3,068   
1974 214      430      - 165      6          43        2006 8,042   17,388 3,060   5,461   1,700   3,775   
1975 729      501      - 191      38        119      2007 8,346   18,849 3,079   5,659   2,593   4,478   
1976 2,629   565      - 217      357      149      2008 9,042   20,210 3,498   6,077   2,592   5,119   
1977 1,739   625      - 273      620      194      2009 9,586   21,447 3,640   6,395   2,927   5,311   
1978 1,408   856      - 402      510      165      2010 9,892   22,318 3,748   6,618   3,078   5,754   
1979 1,722   1,020   - 275      321      85        2011 10,400 23,085 4,057   6,815   3,206   6,082   
1980 1,554   1,144   - 281      336      147      
Source : State Education Commission 1984-2012.  
GraduationGraduationRecruitment Enrollment Enrollment Recruitment 
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CHAPTER 5 
Conclusion 
With three empirical studies, this dissertation makes clear contributions to the world society 
literature and the research on life course.  The first study evaluates the prevalence and 
dissemination of the idea of societal development, a central component of world culture, at the 
grass-roots level in eight diverse countries.  The second study continues to investigate how the 
idea of societal development leads Chinese people, through associational thinking, to endorse 
family attributes that are believed to be modern.  The third project examines the life course 
dynamics in the pursuit of higher education during mature adulthood, also in the context of 
contemporary China.   
World society theory predicts consensus on the idea of societal development among 
actors at aggregate as well as individual levels.  While much work has been done at the state or 
organizational levels, I offer the first empirical support for the individual presence of world 
culture’s schema of national development.  Based on twelve surveys conducted in Argentina, 
Bulgaria, China, Egypt, Lebanon, Malawi, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S., I have shown that 
ordinary individuals around the world were able to apply the concept of development to evaluate 
different countries. Furthermore, those evaluations are very similar to the developmental 
hierarchies constructed by the United Nations (as represented by Human Development Index), an 
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authoritative agent of the world culture.  World society theory also offers a diffusion model to 
account for the global dissemination of world cultural scripts, where school education and 
society’s connection to the world society have been two most theorized and empirically assessed 
pathways of world culture diffusion.  My analysis confirms that both mechanisms are important 
factors that contribute to the individual conformity to world culture’s developmental schema. 
The second project moves on to examine the consequences of developmental ideas with 
regard to family. Specifically, I demonstrate that the conjunction of people’s favorability of 
societal development and their perceived associations between societal development and certain 
family attributes (i.e., neolocal residence, self-choice marriage, gender equality, later marriage 
for women, and fewer children) jointly lead, at least partially, to the endorsement of those family 
attributes.  Drawing on the developmental idealism (DI) theory in social demography and the 
expectancy-value model in psychology, I articulate this cognitive process and label it DI 
associational evaluation.  Analysis of survey data collected in Gansu, China provides supports 
for DI associational evaluation.  We also find that its influences are robust in the presence of an 
influential local alternative ideational model—Islamic religion. Though the analysis is based on a 
cross-sectional sample in Chinese context, this study has larger implications for the scholarship 
on ideational family change around the world.  Given the continuing expansion of developmental 
ideas around the world, the global rise of modern family values could be to a great extent 
attributable to this micro-level psychological process.   
World culture affects individuals by constructing the way they think about and live their 
lives.  One particularly interesting life course phenomenon is the rise of lifelong education.  
    
125 
 
Though underrepresented in the literature, Chinese people’s pursuit of higher education in 
mature adulthood have accounted for approximately a half of the undergraduate credential output 
in the history of the People’s Republic of China.  As transitions to higher education at older ages 
are likely to occur in the presence of and be influenced by alternative adulthood life course 
activities, such progressions are qualitatively different from direct transitions to undergraduate 
programs immediately upon the completion of secondary education.  My third study, therefore, 
chooses to focus on the life course dynamics in Chinese people’s adulthood higher education 
(AHE).  By constructing annualized life histories across ages 18-45 based on retrospective 
information in Chinese General Social Survey 2003, I allow for sequential variability of 
adulthood events.  As a result, I find that marriage and parenthood decreased one’s likelihood to 
get enrolled in AHE, whereas having a job increased the likelihood.  The contributing effect of 
employment was attributable to state sponsorship in PRC’s urban work regime.  Specifically, 
those whose employments were closer to state power (i.e., in Party/government agencies and 
state-owned professional services) or those who enjoyed advantageous statuses at the work place 
(i.e., cadre leaders and Party members) were much more likely to advance to AHE during 
adulthood.  Furthermore, such institutional advantages became even more pronounced since 
1978.  With this finding this study also makes an extension to the argument of maximally 
maintained inequality (MMI) in the literature on educational stratification.  Namely, in the 
context of post-1978 educational expansion, certain pre-existing stratifying mechanisms (i.e., 
work-based state sponsorship) were found to be stronger than in the pre-reform period (1949-
1977).  While MMI originally referred to persistent class inequalities, our paper extended the 
theme to the inequalities due to state power.  
